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Abstract: Health Insurance (HI) programmes in low-income countries aim to 
reduce the burden of individual out-of-pocket (OOP) health care 
expenditure. However, if the decisions to purchase insurance and to seek 
care when ill are correlated with the expected healthcare expenditure, 
the use of naïve models may produce biased estimates of the impact of 
insurance membership on OOP expenditure. Whilst many studies in the 
literature have accounted for the endogeneity of the insurance decision, 
the potential selection bias due to the care-seeking decision has not 
been taken into account. We extend the Heckman selection model to account 
simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection 
biases in the healthcare expenditure regression model. The proposed model 
is illustrated in the context of a Vietnamese HI programme and results 
compared with those of alternative models making no or partial allowance 
for selection bias.  In this illustrative example, the impact of 
insurance membership on reducing OOP expenditures was underestimated by 
21 percentage points when selection biases were not taken into account. 
We believe this is an important methodological contribution that will be 
relevant to future empirical work. 
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15 August 2016 
 
Editor-in-Chief, Social Science and Medicine 
 
Dear Professor Coast: 
 
On behalf of my co-authors, I would like to submit RXUUHVSRQVHWRUHYLHZHUV¶FRPPHQWVDQGthe 
revised version of our manuscript titled ³Addressing care-seeking as well as insurance-seeking 
selection biases in estimating the impact of health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditure´ for 
consideration in Social Science and Medicine. 
 
In the attached documentsZHKDYHDGGUHVVHGUHYLHZHUV¶FRPPents in detail. As suggested by the 
reviewers, we have motivated the paper by going through the methods used in the literature to address 
selection into insurance and care-seeking, with particular attention to studies that addressed both 
observable and unobservable factors. We have also clarified the need to account for the care-seeking 
selection bias by elaborating on intensive and extensive margins, and generalisability of the impact of 
health insurance to the population (and not just those who sought health care). 
 
Also, we have discussed the context of randomised and non-randomised studies of health insurance, 
particularly in the context of the RAND experiment (as suggested by one of the reviewers). In the 
methods section, we have also clarified our model presentation. Finally, we have added an appendix 
table (and detailed discussion) on the econometric models and findings of studies published on 
9LHWQDP¶VKHDOWKLQVXUDQFHSURJUDPPH 
 
We have revised the manuscript in the light of these comments. We have provided a marked copy of 
the changes made in the previous article with track changes in Word. We thank the reviewers for their 
helpful and constructive comments, and hope that this revised version will contribute to the contents 
of Social Science and Medicine. 
 
We look forward to your response and would be happy to answer any questions that you may have on 
this paper. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Shehzad Ali 
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Addressing care-seeking as well as insurance-seeking selection biases in estimating the impact of 
health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures 
5HVSRQVHWRUHYLHZHUV¶FRPPHQWV 
Reviewer 1 
The authors while revising the manuscript have taken into account my comments and suggestions 
noted when I reviewed for the first time.  
I have noticed that the authors have now used the out-of-pocket cost instead of out-of-pocket 
expenditure.  My suggestions were not to use them interchangeably as I believe they have different 
connotations and it also depend on the items of expenditure that are included. "Cost" has wider 
perspective - some of the items to be included may not have been collected during the survey. It will 
be useful to check what information has been collected during the data collection for the data sets 
used, and may be useful to note/define OOP cost or OOP exp. My suggestions would be to use out-of-
pocket expenditure or out-of- pocket payments instead of OOP cost, and include definition in the text. 
 
The authors point in reply to my point 7 when I reviewed the first submission: The generalizability of 
the findings for other type insurance - e.g. social insurance or compulsory health insurance is not very 
straight forward. What the authors have added has covered the main points, however, it is important to 
note there may be different situation. The participation or enrolment may be mandatory - everyone is 
covered with no payment at the point of use, or everyone covered with different levels of cop-
payments at the point of use. 
We thank the reviewer for their helpful comments. We now use the term µout-of-pocket expenditure¶ 
which we agree is more appropriate in this context (see edits in the paper). Also, we have clarified the 
definition of healthcare expenditure on p.13 (under the heading µData¶). 
³Respondents were asked to recall direct health care expenditures (i.e. user fees for consultations, 
diagnostic tests and medicines), indirect expenditures (food and hospital stay, travel and other 
expenditures) and any unofficial payments (i.e. gifts to health care providers). OOP expenditure was 
then defined as the sum of these expenditures.´ 
Also, in the discussion section, we now acknowledge that the impact of health insurance and the level 
of selection biases depend on the type of health insurance, level of coverage and the context of the 
study. We have added the following paragraph in the discussion section. 
³Moreover, selection biases also depend on the type of coverage and benefits of health insurance 
programme as well as the study context. For instance, while compulsory health insurance 
programmes are generally not affected by insurance-seeking adverse selection, they may still suffer 
from care-seeking selection issue. In case of Vietnam, Sepehri et al (2011) evaluated both compulsory 
health insurance (CHI) and voluntary health insurance (VHI) programmes and found that the impact 
of CHI on reducing OOP healthcare expenditure was higher than VHI. This may be partly because 
VHI is more likely to be influenced by adverse selection. Similarly, coverage (such as type of services 
and health facilities covered) and level of insurance co-payment may also the impact of insurance and 
the influence insurance-seeking and care-seeking selection biases.´ 
 
 
*Response to Reviewers* (NO AUTHOR DETAILS)
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Reviewer 2 
I think this paper is a good report for a project, although that the results do not differ from other 
papers on Vietnamese insurance.  I do not think it merits publication if we know the results from 
Vietnam well.  The authors can show how this results differs from other Vietnam literature in detail.   
I do not think it generates any methodological interest.  I had indicated this before.  Here are my 
reasons to think the paper should not be published as it does not say much about insurance issues.   
 
I first draw attention to Angrist and Pischke 2009.  It is not clear whether one should correct for 0 
expenditure.   That would be an interesting discussion.  Given that most people correct for this let us 
ask if this is anything new.  The RAND experiment used a local average treatment effect (LATE) for 
selection into insurance to carry out: 
 
E[y > 0, insurance] P[y>0] -  E[y > 0, not insurance] P[y>0]. 
 
Angrist and Pischke raise some legitimate concerns in the insurance type model, regarding this type of 
model.  That is the ones who do not pay at all in case of insurance may be different from those who do 
not pay without insurance.  Thus selection of everyone on paying may be not be correct.  Examine 
their equation 3.4.5.  I don't think they reach a conclusive statement.  But this is where 
methodological discussions lie.  It would be interesting to see a fuller discussion on this.   I think what 
they are pointing to is that selection to incur payment itself is shaped by having insurance.   I would 
think this would be present in using the LATE; I am not sure.  But these are very important issues.  
 
Now let us suppose that the two part selection effect is a legitimate thing to be concerned about.   One 
can say use a selection to insurance and then run a weighted PSM regression on cost that is selected 
through some kind censored method.  This is done in a Wagstaff paper or may be in Wagstaff and 
Lindelow. 
 
[PLEASE MAKE SURE THE NOTATION IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR] Now, I cannot follow your 
notation.  I understand models 1-3.  What are 4a and 4b?  You estimate 10 with IMR on the left 
censored cost equation.  This is roughly LATE if we had randomized assignment followed by 
purposive uptake of insurance.   This is your paper.   
 
I am not sure what type of problems your approach may induce for the error terms.  But that is indeed 
not the remit of SSM.     
 
The double selections issue has been address before through PSM and as I stated in the RAND 
experiment.  The RAND method cannot be used as you do not have a RCT.  You use IMR for 
insurance and then use a censored estimation.  This is just another method.  If you carried out this 
using PSM weights and see differences then it would be a methodological paper.  I don't think using 
IMR for the censored expenditure data is worthy research by itself.  
I leave it to the editor to make the decision.    
 
{PLEASE ADDRESS] At the least examine how both selection into insurance and the censored 
expenditure has been dealt with in the literature.  I believe Acharya et al. raise this issue.  If you can 
motivate this by going through some work on this, for example the RAND paper and most of the 
papers by Wagstaff and colleagues, would be a publishable paper.  One way to do this is to examine 
how this dual selection has been done and what are the methodological issues behind it.   
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[PLEASE ADDRESS] A further issue is that you need to show in more detail how your findings 
contrast the other Vietnam insurance findings. Make a table of type of data used, the approach, and 
the results.   
We thank the reviewer for their helpful comments. Our detailed response is presented below. 
Acharya et al. (2012) report findings of a systematic review of the impact of insurance programmes in 
developing countries. In terms of potential biases, they found that insurance studies in developing 
countries mainly account for insurance-selection bias due to adverse selection and cream skimming 
(p. 92-93), while only a handful of studies account for the care-seeking decision (p. 45, 94). However, 
they do not find any studies that accounted for both types of biases. In line with their findings, and to 
further motivate the need for correcting for care-seeking bias by considering both extensive and 
intensive margins, we have now added the following in the manuscript (end of p.6). 
³,QDV\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZRILQVXUDQFHVWXGLHVLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV$FKDU\DHWDO2) found that 
care-seeking selection is not commonly addressed in the literature. Most studies ignore this by either 
using only the positive expenditure in the analysis (Jowett et al 2003), or treating zero and non-zero 
expenditures on the same scale without addressing the selection issue. Other insurance studies take a 
two-part modelling approach, separating the probability of seeking care from health care expenditure 
(conditional on seeking care). The following approaches have been used in the insurance literature in 
developing countries (Acharya et al 2012): Tobit model, two-part models and selection models. These 
models include the care-seeking decision in the first part followed by health expenditure equation in 
the second part. 
There is a strong case for separating the probability of seeking care from health care expenditure to 
assess the extensive margin i.e. decisions to seek care and impact on demand for contact with the 
health care service, which relies mainly on individual circumstances or preferences, degree of 
insurance coverage and access to health care services. This is then followed by evaluating the 
intensive margin which is primarily an agency relationship where treatment decisions are made by 
the treating physician, and influenced by the organisation, quality, prices and incentives in the health 
care system. 
Separating out the contributions of health insurance in extensive and intensive margins on out-of-
pocket expenditures is important. For instance, total OOP expenditure could increase if the extensive 
margin (threshold for seeking care) decreases, as greater frequency of treatment increases total 
expenditure. However, the impact of decreasing threshold on OOP expenditure once care is sought 
could also be negative if, for instance, more timely care due to lower threshold for care seeking 
impacts severity of illness when care is sought and treatment needs (due to more timely intervention). 
On the other hand, having insurance could affect treatment decisions of the physician and patients, 
i.e. prescription of more intensive and/or expensive treatments  or the patient is exposed to risk of 
supplier induced demand (as observed in case of China [18]). Therefore, it is important to explore the 
influence of these different factors on health care expenditures, which the selection model intrinsically 
enables by estimating the propensity to seek care and indicating how this impacts expenditures once 
care is sought.´ 
With regards to the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, it explored the effects of different co-payment 
levels and health insurance contracts (not whether individuals were insured or not) on health care 
utilisation. The two part model was used to disentangle the effects on the probability of seeking care 
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i.e. the extensive margin and on health care expenditures (total and not just out of pocket) incurred 
given different co-payment levels. 
In case of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, the randomisation ensured that different 
populations exposed to varying co-payments were comparable. Hence, as the reviewer indicated, there 
would be no need to allow for selection bias from care-seeking across co-payment groups as we could 
assume randomisation balances the unobserved propensity to seek care across co-payment groups. 
Therefore, the observed effect of insurance on OOP expenditures for those seeking care across 
individuals with different co-payment levels would not be biased by differences in the unobserved 
propensity to seek care, which would be similar across co-payment groups due to randomisation. The 
estimated co-payment effects on the probability of seeking care and on health care expenditures 
incurred (once care is sought) would be the ATE in the population (assuming homogenous effects 
across the population). If the effects of co-payments were more heterogenous across the population, 
then the second stage effect on positive expenditures in the RAND approach would be a LATE, and 
as stated before, would not be biased from care seeking selection because randomisation ensures that 
unobserved care seeking thresholds associated with health care expenditures are balanced across co-
payment groups. 
However, in non-randomised setting (such as ours), we do not have comparability in observable and 
unobservable characteristics associated with insurance choice, the propensity to seek care and the 
expected health care expenditures once care is sought. In this setting, thresholds for consulting are not 
balanced between the two groups; hence, it is not certain that, in a homogenous treatment 
environment, effect of health insurance on OOP expenditure once care is sought would be the same 
for those that did and did not choose to receive health care. Hence, to generalise our findings and to 
estimate an ATE for the population of those choosing to insure and not insure (assuming a 
homogenous effect of insurance) we should allow for selection bias in the model for health care 
expenditures. The Heckman MLE also estimates an ATE and not LATE. That is, we can generalise 
our findings to individuals who did not seek care, which addresses the important questioQµ:hat 
would have been the effects of health insurance had these individuals sought care?¶ The allowance for 
care seeking selection enables us to answer that question (Madden 2008). 
We have added the following paragraph in the discussion section: 
 
³7KHPRGHOOLQJDSSURDFKXVHGLQWKLVVWXG\LVUHOHYDQWWRQRQ-randomised settings evaluating the 
effect on insurance on OOP expenditures. Randomised studies, such as the RAND health insurance 
experiment which allocated individuals to different health insurance plans, are likely to have 
balanced groups in terms of their unobserved propensity to seek care (by virtue of randomisation). As 
a result, the average treatment effect can be estimated without the need to account for selection 
biases. However, most health insurance studies are not randomised, and therefore need to consider 
the issue of care seeking selection bias. Allowing for sample selection bias implies estimates can be 
generalised to individuals who did not seek care (Madden 2008), which addresses the important 
question of µ:KDWZRXOGKDYHEHHQWKHHIIHFWVRIKHDOWKLQVXUDQFHKDGWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOVVRXJKW
FDUH"¶.´ 
With regards to summarising other relevant studies, including Wagstaff insurance studies, we note 
that these studies use PSM and difference-in-difference methods to account for insurance-seeking 
selection bias only; however, they do not address the care-seeking selection bias which is where this 
study adds to the literature. However, based on the UHYLHZHU¶VFRPPHQWwe now provide a detailed 
description of methods used in the literature (see below) to correct for insurance-seeking decision. 
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³A number of approaches have been used in the literature to adjust for selection bias due to 
insurance-purchase/participation decision. These methods can be classified based on whether they 
deal with selection on observable covariates (or simply observables) or unobservable covariates (or 
unobservables) [27]. Selection on observables is commonly addressed using regression analysis or 
propensity score matching [21]. The debate on regression versus matching to control for observables 
is not yet settled, with some authors concluding that the difference between estimates is not likely to 
be of major empirical significance [29]. The advantage of matching over regression is that it matches 
individuals based on their propensity to buy insurance by restricting the sample to observations that 
are comparable (at least in terms of observed characteristics). Moreover, matching methods make 
fewer assumptions about model specification. However, if the distribution of observed characteristics 
is similar in the insured and uninsured groups, and there is complete overlap between the two groups 
in terms of the range of propensity scores (i.e. they have common support), then regression analysis 
will not rely on predicting expected outcomes based on observed characteristics beyond the ranges of 
observable characteristics in the insured and uninsured groups, and will give similar results to 
regression analysis. 
 
For selection on unobservables of insurance-seeking decision, a number of methods exist in the 
literature. These include structural models and control functions; instrumental variables; regression 
discontinuity; and difference-in-difference [27]. Structural models involve specifying a model to 
determine treatment assignment and then jointly estimating this model with the outcome (i.e. OOP 
expenditure). Control function approach involves separately estimating the outcome equation, and 
FDSWXULQJLQVXUDQFHVHOHFWLRQELDVE\LQFOXGLQJDFRQWUROWHUPNQRZQDV,QYHUVH0LOOV¶5DWLR
explained later) from a probit model for insurance selection [34]. This approach was taken by Jowett 
et al (2003) [24]. Instrumental variable approach is based on finding one or more variables that 
predict treatment (insurance) assignment but are not directly correlated with the outcome (OOP 
expenditure). This approach has been used by a number of studies, including Wagstaff and Lindelow 
(2008) [18]. Regression discontinuity design is used when assignment to treatment changes 
discontinuously with respect to some threshold value which determines whether someone is in the 
treated (insured) or untreated (uninsured) group. This approach was used by Bauhoff et al (2011) 
[35] and Miller et al (2009) [36]. Difference-in-difference approach (or double differencing) involves 
taking the difference in outcome (i.e. OOP expenditure) between insured and uninsured groups before 
and after the introduction of insurance and then taking the difference in these differences. This 
approach requires data in both pre-treatment and post-treatment periods and can be used with 
longitudinal/panel data or with multiple cross-sections [37] [38]). This approach has been commonly 
used in the literature to control for unobserved heterogeneity associated with the insurance decision 
(see below). 
 
Selection into insurance based on both observables and unobservables can be simultaneously dealt 
with by combining the above methods. For instance, regression-based models that deal with 
unobservables (such as Heckman sample selection model) also account for selection on observables 
by including observed covariates in the OOP expenditure regression model (Jowett et al 2003) [24]. 
Another common example of jointly addressing selection on observable and unobservables is by 
combining propensity score matching (for selection on observables) and difference-in-difference 
method (for selection on unobservables). For example, Axelson et al (2009) [39] use propensity score 
matching to control for observable differences between insured and uninsured, and difference-in-
difference approach to control for time-invariant unobserved factors that may be correlated with 
outcomes. This approach has been commonly used in the insurance literature [19] [40] [41] [42]. 
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Wagstaff et al (2010) [43] extend this approach by combining propensity score matching with triple 
differencing which involves subtracting two previous difference-in-differences in outcome measures 
from two later difference-in-differences measures using available data for three periods.  
However, the methods discussed above only account for differences in unobservables in one of the 
two decisions (generally the insurance-seeking decision) but not both.´ 
 
Also, we have clarified the specification of Model 4 in the paper. 
Finally, for direct comparison with our study, we have reviewed papers evaluating health insurance 
programmes in Vietnam, including those authored by Wagstaff. As suggested by the reviewer, we 
have included a table (see below) which summarises the datasets and methods used in these papers as 
well as the results. Also, we have compared our results with these studies from Vietnam in the 
discussion section. The following text has been added in the paper. 
³In case of Vietnam, a number of studies have used a national dataset from different waves of the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) as well as other surveys to evaluate the impact 
of different types of health insurance programmes. Appendix table A3 summarises the data sources, 
methods and results of studies. These studies evaluated one or more of the following insurance 
programmes in Vietnam: (1) voluntary health insurance (VHI); (2) compulsory health insurance 
(CHI); (3) Vietnam Health Care Fund for the Poor (VHCFP); and (4) free healthcare for children 
under 6 years. These studies come to different conclusions based on the type of programme being 
evaluated, the dataset used and the analytical methods applied. For instance, Sepehri et al. (2006) 
[25] evaluated both VHI and CHI together using VHLSS for 1992-3 and 1997-8 and corrected for 
care-seeking bias using Tobit model (fixed and random effects) but did not account for insurance 
endogeneity. They found that insurance reduce OOP expenditure by 17% to 20%. Jowett et al (2003) 
also evaluated VHI and used the same dataset as our study, and corrected for insurance endogeneity 
but not care-seeking bias (and only used positive OOP expenditure observations). They found that 
VHI significantly reduced OOP expenditure, although their coefficients are much larger than ours 
results because they only used observations with positive OOP expenditures (therefore, their model 
results cannot be generalised to the wider population). Finally, Nguyen (2012) [6] evaluated the 
impact of VHI using VHLSS 2004 and 2006 using PSM and double differencing (i.e. difference-in-
difference) to account for insurance selection and found that the effect of VHI on OOP expenditures is 
not statistically significant; however, they found that insurance increases the annual outpatient and 
inpatient visits by 45% and 70% respectively which partly explains no statistically significant 
reduction in OOP expenditure despite insurance reducing the price of care. 
Wagstaff (2007) [55] evaluated VHCFP programme in Vietnam using VHLSS 2004 wave using 
propensity score matching (PSM) for insurance selection and found that insurance did not reduce the 
average out-of-pocket expenditure because it increased the probability and number of inpatient and 
outpatient visits. The same programme was evaluated by Axelson et al (2009) using PSM followed by 
double differencing for insurance endogeneity, and by Wagstaff (2010) using PSM followed by triple 
differencing to account for both observed and unobserved heterogenety (see Appendix for details). 
Axelson et al (2009) found that VHCFP reduced only inpatient OOP but not overall expenditure, while 
Wagstaff (2010) found that VHCFP reduced both inpatient OOP and total OOP expenditures. Finally, 
Sepehri et al (2011) evaluated CHI, VHI and VHCFP using VHLSS waves 2004 and 2006 using fixed 
and random effects models and found that CHI and VHI reduced OOP expenditure at district hospitals 
by 40% and 32% respectively but did not reduce expenditure for those using commune health centres. 
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The above studies account for observables, and in most cases also unobservable) of the insurance-
seeking decision (through PSM or regression with/without difference-in-difference methods). 
However, none of these studies simultaneously accounted for care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
biases which may partly explain some of these differences in findings [56].´  
Below we present the table which we suggest should be included in the appendix. 
Table A3: Summary of published studies evaluating the impact of health insurance in Vietnam 
Study Data Type of analysis Results 
Jowett et al 
(2003) 
Single cross-sectional 
survey conducted in 
year 1999 using 
purposive sampling to 
evaluate the voluntary 
comSRQHQWRI9LHWQDP¶V 
voluntary health 
insurance (VHI) 
programme ± before the 
introduction of Vietnam 
Health Care Fund for 
the Poor (VHCFP). 
Survey conducted in 3 
provinces (Ninh Binh, 
Hai Phong and Dong 
Thap). This data is the 
same as used in our 
paper. 
HecNPDQ¶VWZR-step regression 
was used to correct for 
insurance endogeneity. First 
step was a probit regression for 
probability of insurance. 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) was 
obtained from this model and 
included in the OLS regression 
for out-of-pocket (OOP) 
expenditure. The expenditure 
equation included only non-
zero values for health 
expenditure; hence, care-
seeking selection was ignored. 
Overall, health insurance 
was found to reduce average 
out-of-pocket expenditures. 
The dependent variable was 
the log of out-of-pocket 
expenditure. The coefficient 
on insurance was -2.080 
(p=0.001) after correcting 
for insurance endogeneity 
which was interpreted 
incorrectly as 200% 
reduction in expenditure. 
Sepehri et 
al (2006) 
National data from 
1992-3 and 1997-8 
waves of the Vietnam 
Household Living 
Standards Survey 
(VHLSS) to evaluate 
9LHWQDP¶VKHDOWK
insurance programme; 
however, unlike Jowett 
et al (2003), both 
compulsory 
(predominant) and 
voluntary health 
insurance was included 
and jointly evaluated 
because VLSS did not 
provide distinction 
between the two types. 
Two approaches were used 
with panel individual effect: (1) 
Tobit model which treats zero 
expenditure as censored (i.e. 
censored value for selecting 
into care, not insurance); and 
(2) truncated regression which 
uses only positive expenditure. 
Fixed and random effects 
models were used. 
 
Insurance endogeneity bias was 
not taken into account, partly 
because both compulsory and 
voluntary insurance was 
included. 
Random and fixed effects 
models produce different 
results. Final set of results 
show that health insurance 
reduces out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (between 17 and 
20%). 
Wagstaff 
(2007) 
National data from 
VHLSS 2004. The study 
evaluated VHCFP 
which was introduced in 
2003. 
Propensity score matching was 
used to account for insurance 
endogeneity, followed by 
regression weighted by 
propensity score weights. 
Total out-of-pocket health 
spending is reduced by 
VHCFP in the simple PSM 
but not with the regression. 
The study concluded that 
VHCFP did not reduce the 
average out-of-pocket 
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Study Data Type of analysis Results 
spending because it 
increased the probability and 
the number of inpatient and 
outpatient visits. A 
secondary finding was that 
VHCFP reduced the risk of 
catastrophic spending by 3-
4%. 
Axelson et 
al (2009) 
VHLSS data from 2002 
(pre-VHCFP) and 2004 
(post-VHCFP) 
First analysis used PSM for 
selection into insurance 
followed by single differencing 
(i.e. difference in OOP between 
insured and uninsured at one 
time point) in a cross-section 
analysis of VHLSS 2004. 
Second analysis used PSM 
followed by double 
differencing (or difference-in-
difference, i.e. first calculating 
the mean difference in outcome 
before and after the 
intervention for the insured and 
uninsured groups separately, 
followed by calculating the 
difference between the mean 
differences of the two groups). 
This is done using panel dataset 
for VHLSS 2002 and 2004; the 
double differencing is to take 
account of time-invariant 
unobserved factors. 
The result from the double 
differencing differs from 
single-differencing. Single 
differencing found 
statistically significant 
reduction in OOP at 
household level by 19% 
(although reduction in per 
capita expenditure of 14% 
was not significant). Results 
of difference-in-difference 
also found reduction in 
health care expenditure but 
they were only significant 
for inpatient care 
expenditure (absolute 
reduction of 134.6 
Vietnamese Dong). 
Wagstaff 
(2010) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 
2002, 2004 and 2006 
waves. 
Triple-differencing which 
involves difference-in-
difference over three periods, 
i.e. besides the double 
difference-in-difference 
between insured and uninsured 
(as above), a further difference 
LVWDNHQWRµQHWRXW¶WKH
difference between the same 
groups in the change in mean 
OOP over an earlier period. 
Instead of assuming parallel 
trends in the unobservables for 
the insured and uninsured 
groups, it assumes that the 
change in unobservables for 
each group in the two periods 
(2002-2004) and (2004-2006) 
is the same. This method can 
be used with regression or 
matching to control for 
observables.  
Single-difference with 
matching found no 
significant impact of 
VHCFP on out-of-pocket 
spending. Double and triple-
differencing found 
significant negative impact 
on total OOP expenditure (-
181 and -327 VND 
respectively) and OOP 
expenditure on inpatient 
care (-131 and -248 VND 
respectively). 
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Study Data Type of analysis Results 
The proposed method estimates 
programme impact on those 
covered by it but not those 
currently not covered. 
Sepehri et 
al (2011) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 
2004 and 2006 waves. 
The focus is on 
compulsory health 
insurance (CHI), VHI 
and insurance for the 
poor. 
Fixed and random effects 
models were used. Fixed 
effects analysis was intended to 
control for time-invariant 
unobserved individual effects. 
Endogeneity bias due to 
adverse selection into insurance 
was not taken into account. 
Random effects analysis 
showed that CHI and VHI 
reduce OOP spending by 
about 24% while health 
insurance for the poor 
reduces it by 15%. 
However, in the fixed 
effects analysis, the 
coefficients for CHI and 
VHI were not 
significant. Further analysis 
showed that CHI and VHI 
reduce OOP expenditures by 
40 and 32%, respectively for 
those using district hospitals 
but not significant for 
commune centres.  
Nguyen 
(2012) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 
2004 and 2006 waves. 
The focus is on 
voluntary health 
insurance. 
PSM followed by double 
differencing (i.e. difference-in-
difference). 
The effect of voluntary 
health insurance on out  ?of ?
pocket expenditure on health 
care services is not 
statistically significant; 
however, insurance 
increases the annual 
outpatient and inpatient 
visits by 45% and 70% 
respectively which partly 
explains no statistically 
significant reduction in OOP 
despite insurance reducing 
the price of care. 
Nguyen 
and Wang 
(2013) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 
2004 and 2006 waves. 
The focus was on 
evaluating a government 
policy to provide free 
healthcare for children 
\RXQJHUWKDQௗ\HDUV. 
The policy came into 
effect in the beginning 
of 2005. 
Difference-in-difference 
approach using VHLSS wave 
2004 (pre-policy) and 2006 
(post-policy) in a regression 
model controlling for potential 
confounders. 
Free health insurance 
reduced OOP health 
expenditure by US$5.09 in 
the age group 4-7. It also 
reduced the probability of 
having catastrophic OOP 
expenditure by 1.7 
percentage point. 
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ABSTRACT 
Health Insurance (HI) programmes in low-income countries aim to reduce the burden of 
individual out-of-pocket (OOP) health care costexpenditure. However, if the decisions to 
purchase insurance and to seek care when ill are correlated with the expected healthcare 
expenditurecost, the use of naïve models may produce biased estimates of the impact of 
insurance membership on OOP costexpenditures. Whilst many studies in the literature have 
accounted for the endogeneity of the insurance decision, the potential selection bias due to 
the care-seeking decision has not been taken into account. We extend the Heckman selection 
model to account simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases 
in the healthcare expenditure a cost of care regression model. The proposed model is 
illustrated in the context of a Vietnamese HI programme and results compared with those of 
alternative models making no or partial allowance for selection bias.  In this illustrative 
example, the impact of insurance membership on reducing OOP expenditures costs was 
underestimated by 21 percentage points when selection biases were not taken into account. 
We believe this is an important methodological contribution that will be relevant to future 
empirical work. 
 
Key words: Health insurance; selection bias; endogeneity; Heckman model; low-income 
countries  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Out of pocket (OOP) payment is the predominant mechanism of health care financing in most 
low-income countries, accounting for over half of the total expenditure on health  in low 
income countries [1]. These payments create financial barriers to health care access, 
especially for the poor, often resulting in long delays in seeking care until disease severity has 
progressed so far that much prolonged and expensive treatment is required [2]. Van Doorslaer 
et al (2007) [3] found that, among Asian countries, reliance on OOP payments was highest in 
Vietnam and India, where >80% of total health expenditures were funded by OOP 
expenditurespayments. In the same study, Vietnam also had the highest proportion of 
individuals incurring catastrophic payments; this was reported to be 34%, 15% and 8.5% at 
threshold levels of 5%, 10% and 15% of total household expenditure. 
In recent decades, many low-income countries have embarked on voluntary health insurance 
(VHI) programmes commonly characterised as not-for-profit, voluntary membership schemes 
with affordable, community-rated premia for all individuals. They may be organised at local 
or regional levels, like SEWA and ACCORD in India [4] and Grameen in Bangladesh [5], or 
at national level, like in Vietnam [6], Ghana [7] and Mexico [8]. The overarching aim of VHI 
programmes is to reduce the burden of out-of-pocket expenditurespayments, and in turn 
provide financial protection to the target population. Based on the same principle, recent 
policy focus has been on providing universal health coverage (UHC) which entitles all people 
to access health care funded through publicly organised risk pooling [9]. Most high income 
countries already have some form of UHC while many middle and low-income countries 
(LMIC) are making significant progress in this direction [10] [11]. However, coverage in 
most LMICs is far from universal, both in terms of enrolment rates and the level of financial 
protection [11]. Moreover, use of care among the enrolled is often restricted by geographical 
access and co-payment contributions, resulting in forgone necessary care [12]. 
Several studies in recent years have focused on monitoring progress and evaluating 
effectiveness of various forms of risk pooling in providing financial protection (note: from 
KHUHRQZHZLOOXVHWKHJHQHULFWHUPµhealth insurance¶IRUDOOIRUPVRIULVNSRROLQJ. While 
most studies found a positive effect of health insurance on reducing OOP expenditures 
spending [13] [8] [14] [15] [16] [17], some studies found mixed, negative or no significant 
effect [18] [19] [20]. Systematic reviews focusing on performance of health insurance have 
found positive, mixed or inconclusive evidence on financial protection [21] [22] [23].  
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To measure the impact of health financing programmes on OOP, robust and consistent 
methods are required. The available evidence on the impact of insurance on OOP 
expenditures payments may have limitations due to differences in quantitative methodologies 
employed in evaluation studies. It has been noted in the literature that when the analysis is 
based on observed OOP costexpenditures, it may be biased due to individual-level selection 
decisions that influence the level of incurred expenditurecosts [24] [25] [26]. Two selection 
decisions are particularly important in the context of evaluating the impact of health 
insurance on OOP expenditures costs in low-income countries. These are insurance-seeking 
and care-seeking selection decisions. Both decisions are determined by observable and 
unobservable characteristics that may also be correlated with expenditure cost ofon health 
care. It is now common for studies of the impact of VHI on OOP expenditure costs to allow 
for insurance-seeking bias due to adverse selection (based on both observable and 
unobservable characteristics).  However, previous studies have not allowed for care-seeking 
selection bias. This study is innovative in allowing simultaneously for these two potential 
sources of bias. Our study extends the selection models to simultaneously correct for 
selection bias due to insurance-seeking as well as care-seeking decisions. The aim of this 
study is to illustrate this approach to estimate the impact of health insurance on OOP 
expenditure costs using observational data. We compare the results with those of alternative 
models that allow for selection biases only partially or not at all.  For the purpose of 
illustration, this study uses data from a cross-sectional household survey of three provinces of 
Vietnam, conducted during the year 1999. However, the focus of this study is 
methodological. 
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking selection decisions may potentially bias OOP health care expenditurecost  
analysis. This is followed by some brief background on the Vietnamese voluntary health 
insurance programme, to help put the empirical results into context. Section 3 discusses the 
data and the econometric models employed in this analysis. Section 4 presents the results of 
econometric analysis, and finally, section 5 discusses the implications of the study findings. 
2. SELECTION BIASES IN MEASURING THE IMPACT OF VHI 
When selection decisions are correlated with the OOP expenditurecost  of health care due to 
observable or unobservable characteristics, as discussed in detail below, the estimate of the 
impact of health insurance on OOP expenditurecost of care may be biased [27]. One potential 
                                                 Addressing care-seeking as well as insurance-seeking selection biases                       
5 
 
source of bias is insurance selection. For example, individuals may be more likely to 
purchase insurance if they expect high future healthcare expenditurescosts, i.e. voluntary 
insurance may be prone to adverse selection. This is also relevant to health financing 
programmes that are moving in the direction of universal health coverage; these programmes 
often include an element of choice for the enrolment decision which can be influenced by 
expected future healthcare expenditurescosts. If so, then the insured may have greater health 
care needs and in turn higher expenditure costs than the uninsured, even after allowing for 
observed characteristics such as age, sex and self-reported health.  In this case, the mean 
difference in OOP expenditurecost between insured and uninsured groups will under-estimate 
the causal impact of VHI on reducing OOP health care expenditurecost. 
A second source of selection bias is attributable to the care-seeking decision.  When an 
individual is sick and in need of health care, they make a decision to seek care or not, i.e. they 
face the care-seeking decision hurdle. For example, individuals may be less likely to seek 
care if they expect the expenditures costs to be high relative to the benefits, given their 
household financial situation.  This in turn influences whether or not their health care 
expenditurecost  is observed. If the care-seeking decision is correlated with health care 
expenditurescosts, then not accounting for the care-seeking selection in healthcare 
expenditure cost model may bias the estimates. Moreover, the factors associated with the care 
seeking decision may be associated with the insurance decision. 
Selection bias may occur due to observable or unobservable characteristics (i.e. confounders) 
that are also correlated with the outcome of interest. Selection on observables, such as age 
and gender, can be solved by using regression or matching methods [28]. These are 
FRPPRQO\ NQRZQ DV ³FRQWURO VWUDWHJLHV´ DV WKH\ FRQWURO IRU GLIIHUHQFH LQ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV
between those who self-selected and those who did not, to allow causal inference [29].  
However, regression and matching methods do not account for selection on unobservable 
factors that may be correlated with health care expenditurescosts. It is this selection on 
unobservables which is the focus of this paper. For this, the common approaches include 
instrumental variables, control functions and the joint estimation of outcome and selection in 
a structural approach [27]. 
While some studies in the literature have acknowledged but not accounted for potential biases 
due to unobservable characteristics [26, 30], others have corrected for insurance selection 
only and not for care-seeking selection [25] [24] [18] [31]. We start with a more detailed 
discussion of the possible causes and impact of the two forms of selection bias. 
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2.1. Care-seeking selection and its impact on OOP ostexpenditure 
Care-seeking selection bias is a form of sample selection bias that occurs when the outcome 
of interest (in this case, the health care expenditurecost) is only observed for a sub-sample of 
the population that meets some criterion defined with respect to a selection decision (in this 
case, the care-seeking decision), and this selection decision is in turn associated with the 
outcome of interest [32] [33]. Hence, in the case of health care expenditure cost analysis, only 
a subsample of the sick population may seek care and in turn incur health care 
expenditurescost. If the care-seeking decision is not random but is associated with the 
expected healthcare expenditureof care, then we have selection problem. However, if all 
determinants of care-seeking decision (that are correlated with the outcome) are observed and 
included in the outcome (OOP expenditure) regression, then we have accounted for this 
selection bias. On the other hand, if the decision to seek care care-seeking decision is 
correlated with OOP expenditure through unobserved factors not known to the analyst, then 
the estimated coefficients in the expenditure model (including the coefficient on insurance 
membership), based on observed expenditurecost, may be biased. Not accounting for this 
selection will result in coefficient estimation based on a non-random sample. As a result, the 
observed effect of insurance on OOP expenditure will not be generalisable to the population 
who did not seek care. Therefore, to evaluate the policy impact of expanding insurance 
coverage (and hence access to care) to the entire population, it is important to account for 
selection bias induced by care seeking. 
For example, an iQGLYLGXDO¶VGHJUHHRIrisk aversion with respect to health outcomes may be 
an unobserved factor associated with a higher probability of seeking care given illness and 
also with lower expenditure costwhen care is sought. To put this the other way around, the 
subsample of individuals who seek care and have positive expenditurescost may be more risk 
averse and face relatively low expenditures of care. Hence, if risk attitude is not taken into 
account, health care expenditure may be under-estimated when extrapolating estimates of 
effects to the wider population of potential health care users.  Secondly, because insurance 
reduces the price of health care and therefore increases the demand for health care, the insured 
may be more likely to seek care and in turn have  observing  their positive health care 
expenditurescost observed. If so, then the expenditure analysis will under-estimate the impact 
of expanding VHI to the wider population, on reducing OOP healthcare expenditures when 
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care is sought. Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) [18] found evidence of this during analysis of 
three household surveys in China. They found that after controlling for insurance-seeking 
bias, insurance membership was associated with an increased risk of high healthcare 
spending. They concluded that this is because insurance increased the probability of seeking 
care when ill which resulted in higher costexpenditures in the insured group; therefore, an 
evaluation of the impact of voluntary insurance should take account of care-seeking 
behaviour.  
In a systematic review of insurance studies in developing countries, Acharya et al (2012) [21] 
found that care-seeking selection is not commonly addressed in the literature. Most studies 
ignore this by either using only the positive expenditure in the analysis [24], or treating zero 
and non-zero expenditures on the same scale without addressing the selection issue. Other 
insurance studies take a two-part modelling approach, separating the probability of seeking 
care from health care expenditure (conditional on seeking care). The following approaches 
have been used in the insurance literature in developing countries [21]: Tobit model, two-part 
models and selection models. These models include the care-seeking decision in the first part 
followed by health expenditure equation in the second part. 
 
There is a strong case for separating the probability of seeking care from health care 
expenditure to assess the extensive margin i.e. decisions to seek care and impact on demand 
for contact with the health care service, which relies mainly on individual circumstances or 
preferences, degree of insurance coverage and access to health care services. This is then 
followed by evaluating the intensive margin which is primarily an agency relationship where 
treatment decisions are made by the treating physician, and influenced by the organisation, 
quality, prices and incentives in the health care system. 
Separating out the contributions of health insurance in extensive and intensive margins on 
out-of-pocket expenditures is important. For instance, total OOP expenditure could increase if 
the extensive margin (threshold for seeking care) decreases, as greater frequency of treatment 
increases total expenditure. However, the impact of decreasing threshold on OOP expenditure 
once care is sought could also be negative if, for instance, more timely care due to lower 
threshold for care seeking impacts severity of illness when care is sought and treatment needs 
(due to more timely intervention). On the other hand, having insurance could affect treatment 
decisions of the physician and patients, i.e. prescription of more intensive and/or expensive 
treatments  or the patient is exposed to risk of supplier induced demand (as observed in case 
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of China [18]). Therefore, it is important to explore the influence of these different factors on 
health care expenditures, which the selection model intrinsically enables by estimating the 
propensity to seek care and indicating how this impacts expenditures once care is sought. 
To understand all this mathematically, let the health care costexpenditure model be expressed 
as: 
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௒ሺ ?ሻ 
Here ܺ is a vector of observed variables and ߝ௜௒ represents the unobserved predictors of 
costexpenditure. CostExpenditure is only observed to be positive if an individual seeks health 
care, i.e. costexpenditure depends on an endogenous care-seeking decision (ܥ ௜ܵ) such that: 
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ ൜ൌ ൅ݒ݁݂݅ܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ ܻ݁ݏൌ  ?݂݅ܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ ܰ݋  ሺ ?ሻ 
The probability of care-seeking, in turn, can be estimated as a probit model (3): 
ሾܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௭ܼ௜ ൅ߝ௜௖௦ሻሺ ?ሻ 
Here Ȱ represents the distribution of probit model and ܼ represents the observed predictors of 
care-seeking decision, including insurance status. Expenditure is positive if latent 
propensityሺߚ௭ܼ௜) to seek care exceeds the unobserved threshold for an individual. 
If the unobserved predictors in the error terms of equations (1) and (3) are not independent of 
each other, then it implies that the observed costexpenditure onof health care (and the 
estimated coefficients in costexpenditure regression) depends on the care-seeking process. 
This endogenous dependence of the error term violates one of the fundamental assumptions of 
least squares regression and gives rise to sample selection bias. Heckman (1977) [34] explains 
that this selection bias stems from the common problem of omitted variable bias, i.e. a 
situation whereby the model is missing one or more important predictors that are correlated 
with the selection decision as well as the outcome equation. The presence of omitted variable 
bias is then compensated by over- or under-estimating the coefficients of the observed factors 
in the model, such as the insurance variable in this case. As a result, estimated effects on the 
impacts of health insurance on OOP expenditures are unlikely to be generalisable to the wider 
population who were not observed to incur OOP expenditure. 
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2.2. Insurance-seeking selection 
Voluntary health insurance programmes often attract sicker or more risk-averse individuals, 
i.e. insurance-purchase/participation decision is not randomly distributed in the population. 
While regression analysis can control for age, sex and other observed factors, it cannot allow 
for unobservHGDVSHFWVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VKHDOWKSUHIHUHQFHVDQGHQYLURQPHQWWKDWLQIOXHQFH
both health care costexpenditures and the insurance-purchase/participation decision. Insurance 
status may influence both the care-seeking decision and the healthcare costexpenditure. If part 
of this influence occurs through the unobserved determinants of the insurance-
purchase/participation decision that are correlated with healthcare costexpenditure equation, 
then insurance status is not exogenous to the model. This would violate the classical 
exogeneity assumption of linear regression, and the model would suffer from endogeneity 
bias. 
A number of approaches have been used in the literature to adjust for selection bias due to 
insurance-purchase/participation decision. These methods can be classified based on whether 
they deal with selection on observable covariates (or simply observables) or unobservable 
covariates (or unobservables) [27]. Selection on observables is commonly addressed using 
regression analysis or propensity score matching [21]. The debate on regression versus 
matching to control for observables is not yet settled, with some authors concluding that the 
difference between estimates is not likely to be of major empirical significance [29]. The 
advantage of matching over regression is that it matches individuals based on their propensity 
to buy insurance by restricting the sample to observations that are comparable (at least in 
terms of observed characteristics). Moreover, matching methods make fewer assumptions 
about model specification. However, if the distribution of observed characteristics is similar 
in the insured and uninsured groups, and there is complete overlap between the two groups in 
terms of the range of propensity scores (i.e. they have common support), then regression 
analysis will not rely on predicting expected outcomes based on observed characteristics 
beyond the ranges of observable characteristics in the insured and uninsured groups, and will 
give similar results to regression analysis.  
For selection on unobservables of insurance-seeking decision, a number of methods exist in 
the literature. These include structural models and control functions; instrumental variables; 
regression discontinuity; and difference-in-difference [27]. Structural models involve 
specifying a model to determine treatment assignment and then jointly estimating this model 
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with the outcome (i.e. OOP expenditure). Control function approach involves separately 
estimating the outcome equation, and capturing insurance selection bias by including a control 
WHUP NQRZQ DV ,QYHUVH 0LOOV¶ 5DWLR H[SODLQed later) from a probit model for insurance 
selection [34]. This approach was taken by Jowett et al (2003) [24]. Instrumental variable 
approach is based on finding one or more variables that predict treatment (insurance) 
assignment but are not directly correlated with the outcome (OOP expenditure). This 
approach has been used by a number of studies, including Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) 
[18]. Regression discontinuity design is used when assignment to treatment changes 
discontinuously with respect to some threshold value which determines whether someone is in 
the treated (insured) or untreated (uninsured) group. This approach was used by Bauhoff et al 
(2011) [35] and Miller et al (2009) [36]. Difference-in-difference approach (or double 
differencing) involves taking the difference in outcome (i.e. OOP expenditure) between 
insured and uninsured groups before and after the introduction of insurance and then taking 
the difference in these differences. This approach requires data in both pre-treatment and post-
treatment periods and can be used with longitudinal/panel data or with multiple cross-sections 
[37] [38]). This approach has been commonly used in the literature to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with the insurance decision (see below). 
Selection into insurance based on both observables and unobservables can be simultaneously 
dealt with by combining the above methods. For instance, regression-based models that deal 
with unobservables (such as Heckman sample selection model) also account for selection on 
observables by including observed covariates in the OOP expenditure regression model 
(Jowett et al 2003) [24]. Another common example of jointly addressing selection on 
observable and unobservables is by combining propensity score matching (for selection on 
observables) and difference-in-difference method (for selection on unobservables). For 
example, Axelson et al (2009) [39] use propensity score matching to control for observable 
differences between insured and uninsured, and difference-in-difference approach to control 
for time-invariant unobserved factors that may be correlated with outcomes. This approach 
has been commonly used in the insurance literature [19] [40] [41] [42]. Wagstaff et al (2010) 
[43] extend this approach by combining propensity score matching with triple differencing 
which involves subtracting two previous difference-in-differences in outcome measures from 
two later difference-in-differences measures using available data for three periods.  
However, the methods discussed above only account for differences in unobservables in one 
of the two decisions (generally the insurance-seeking decision) but not both. 
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To put this mathematically, the insurance-seeking decision can be represented by a probit 
model: 
ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ 
Here ܸ represents the predictors of insurance-seeking decision. Selection bias arises when 
there is correlation the error terms in equation 4 and equation 1, or between the error terms in 
equation 4 and equation 3.  
 
Finally, the unobserved factors associated with the care seeking decision may be associated 
with the purchase of insurance. This paper proposes a regression-based method to account 
simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases. 
3. DATA AND METHODS  
For the purpose of illustrating our methods, we use household survey data from Vietnam 
collected in the year 1999. These data were originally analysed by Jowett et al (2003) [24].  
However, those authors only accounted for insurance-purchase/participation selection and did 
not take account of care-seeking selection bias. Our study illustrates how to jointly account 
for both insurance-purchase/participation and care-seeking selection biases. We provide a 
short paragraph of background on the Vietnamese health insurance programme below, to help 
readers understand the policy context of this illustrative empirical analysis. 
Vietnam introduced health sector reforms in the 1980s, which resulted in the introduction of 
user fees for services that were previously available free of charge. Between 1993 and 1998, 
public sector user fees rose by over 1,000% in real terms. During the same time period, fees 
for private health professionals rose by almost 600%. In 1993, Vietnam introduced its health 
insurance programme, which included compulsory health insurance for civil servants, and 
voluntary health insurance (the subject of this analysis) for formal and informal sector 
employees, the unemployed and children. In 1998, about 12% of the Vietnamese population 
were covered by the insurance programme, with a little over half covered by the VHI 
programme [44].  
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3.1. Data 
The data and sampling methods are described in detail in Jowett et al (2003) [24] and briefly 
summarised here. Data were collected through one-to-one questionnaire-based interviews 
conducted in three provinces with reasonably high membership rates, i.e. Hai Phong and 
Ninh Binh in the north-east and Dong Thap in the south-west. Within each province, one 
urban and two rural districts were randomly sampled, followed by random sampling of three 
communes within each district, followed by random sampling of insured and uninsured 
individuals with each commune. A total of 1,650 adults and 1,101 children were interviewed, 
of which 19% were residents of Ninh Binh, 40% of Hai Phong and 41% of Dong Thap. The 
survey collected data on baseline demographics, health insurance status, health care 
utilisation, out of pocket payments and self-reported health status for the three months period 
prior to the interview. The socioeconomic status of the respondent was recorded using annual 
household consumption expenditure in the last 12 months, which was adjusted for the 
household size using the following equivalence scale [45]: 
ܧݍݑ݅ݒ݈ܽ݁݊ܿ݁ ?݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ ൌሺܰ݋ ?݋݂ܽ݀ݑ݈ݐݏ ൅ ׎ כ ܰ݋ ?݋݂݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ሻఏሺ ?ሻ 
Following Wagstaff et al (1999) [46], the two unknown parameters ׎ and ߠ were set equal to 
0.5. Since the proportion of insured individuals in the population was small, the survey design 
oversampled the insured members by increasing their sampling frequency. For the purpose of 
analysis, sampling weights were used to account for the sampling structure. 
From a total sample of 2,751 interviewees, 1,192 individuals reported being ill in the past 
three months, of whom 985 sought health care and incurred out of pocket costexpenditure. 
Respondents were asked to recall direct health care expenditures costs (i.e. user fees for 
consultations, diagnostic tests and medicines), indirect expenditures costs (food and hospital 
stay, travel and other costexpenditures) and any unofficial payments (i.e. gifts to health care 
providers). OOP expenditure was then defined as the sum of these expenditures; total costs 
were used in the analysis. Data on insurance premiums had substantial non-responses, 
possibly because many individuals purchased their policy several months before the survey. 
Therefore, following Jowett et al (2003) [24], the premium amount was not included in 
estimations of healthcare costexpenditures for the insured. The resulting underestimation of 
costexpenditures for the insured is unlikely to be substantial, given the low level of premiums 
relative to average health costexpenditures amongst insured patients[24]. However, this does 
not matter for our methodological purposes of illustrating the differences between standard 
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methods and our proposed new method of allowing for care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
selection when estimating out of pocket costexpenditures.  The lack of complete data on 
premia paid does however mean that the ³WUXH´impact of VHI on reducing total health care 
costexpenditures will be slightly over-estimated by both the standard and the proposed 
models. 
3.2. Econometric models 
We used four approaches to model the impact of VHI on out of pocket health care 
costexpenditure. The approaches differed in terms of whether or not the model accounted for 
care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases. All models take as their dependent 
variable the log of the observed individual-level out of pocket costexpenditure onof health 
care. Individuals who did not seek health care, despite reporting illness, had zero observed 
costexpenditure. Since the log of zero is undefined, a positive constant (+1) was added to the 
costexpenditure for all individuals. Household consumption expenditure was also log-
transformed because of the skewed distribution. All models used heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. The econometric models are described below. 
3.2.1. Model 1: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model for costexpenditure onof 
care 
Model 1 is a naïve OLS regression represented by equation 1; it uses (log) observed health 
care costexpenditure for both care-seeking and non-care-seeking individuals.  
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௒ሺ ?ሻ 
Since the costexpenditure onof care equation is semi-logarithmic, the coefficient on insurance 
variable was transformed using equation (6) [47] to estimate the percentage impact of 
insurance on costexpenditure onof care.  
ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݂݋ݎ݉݁݀ ?ܿ݋݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ݐ ൌ ቆߚ െ ? ?ܸܽݎሺߚሻቇ െ  ?ሺ ?ሻ 
Here ߚ is the untransformed regression coefficient on the insurance variable and var(ߚሻ is the 
variance of the untransformed coefficient. The coefficient on the insurance variable represents 
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the impact of insurance membership on out-of-pocket costexpenditure. The OLS model 
ignores selection on unobservables resulting in care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-
selection biases. 
3.2.2. Model 2+HFNPDQ¶VVDPSOHVHOHFWLRQPRGHOto account for care-seeking 
selection only 
Model (2) accounts for care-seekinJ VHOHFWLRQ ELDV E\ XVLQJ +HFNPDQ¶V VDPSOH VHOHFWLRQ
approach that jointly estimates the care-seeking decision and the costexpenditure equation 
(OLS) conditional on care-seeking. This model involves two equations: (a) a care-seeking 
sample selection equation that models the selection decision [equation 3]; and (b) a 
costexpenditure equation using log of health care costexpenditure for individuals who sought 
care [equation 7], i.e. the dependent variable is non-zero costexpenditure conditional on 
seeking care. 
ሾܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௭ܼ௜ ൅ߝ௜௖௦ሻሺ ?ሻ 
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ȁሺܿܽݎ݁ െ ݁ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௛ሺ ?ሻ 
+HFNPDQ¶V PRGHO jointly estimates equations (3) and (7) using maximum likelihood 
estimation, which allows for correlation between the unobserved determinants of the care-
seeking decision and the healthcare costexpenditure of care equation (correlation 
coefficientߩ). The model was identified using functional form assumptions about joint 
normality in correlation of the error terms However, this model only accounts for care-
seeking selection but ignores the insurance selection bias. 
3.2.3. Model 3: Treatment effects model to account for insurance selection only 
 
To account for the endogeneity of the insurance decision, +HFNPDQ¶Vtreatment effects model 
is commonly used [25] [24] [18] [31]. The treatment effects model also contains two 
equations: (a) a selection equation which models the insurance-seeking decision [equation 4]; 
and (b) an unconditional costexpenditure equation [equation 1] which uses log of health care 
costexpenditure for both insured and uninsured individuals for both care-seeking and non-care 
seeking individuals.  
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ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௒ሺ ?ሻ 
The treatment effects model jointly estimates the insurance-seeking probit model and the 
healthcare costexpenditure of care model using maximum likelihood estimation. This allows 
for correlation between the unobserved determinants of the insurance decision and the 
healthcare costexpenditure of care equation. As noted by Wagstaff et al. (2010) [43], the 
model makes the assumption that there are no further unobserved benefits from insurance for 
individuals who choose insurance (i.e. the estimates of the effect of insurance for the insured 
can be generalised to the uninsured if they were to receive insurance). However, the treatment 
effects model ignores the care-seeking selection bias. ,W IXUWKHU GLIIHUV IURP +HFNPDQ¶V
sample selection model (model 2) in two aspects: (a) the endogenous choice variable (i.e. 
insurance variable) directly enters the outcome (costexpenditure) regression; and (b) 
costexpenditure is observed for both choice groups (i.e. insured and uninsured).  
 
The treatment effects model relies on uniquely identifying the insurance selection process 
[equation 4] from the outcome equation [equation 1] using predictors, also known as 
instrumental variables (or simply instruments), that uniquely predict the selection decision, 
i.e. they are correlated with the insurance decision but uncorrelated with OOP 
expenditurescosts except through their effect on insurance. In the current study, the following 
binary variables were used as instrumental variables to identify the insurance-seeking 
GHFLVLRQµUHVSRQGHQWNQRZVWKDW9+,VXEVLGLVHVGUXJVcostexpenditureV¶µUHVSRQGHQWNQRZV
ZKHUH WR EX\ 9+, FDUG¶ µUHVSRQGHQW LV D PHPEHU RI RWKHU PDVVFRPPXQLW\ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶; 
µUHVSRQGHQW KDV PHGLXP WR KLJK OHYHO RI ZRUU\ DERXW SHUVRQDO IXWXUH KHDOWK¶. Also, since 
insurance membership was sought more than three months before the survey, the following 
variables are used to identify the healthcare costexpenditure of care (outcome) equation: 
µhospital inpatient stay LQWKHODVWWKUHHPRQWKV¶and µWKHnumber of illnesses in the last three 
months¶ 
 
3.2.4. Model 4: Two part selection model to account for both care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking biases 
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The previous two models separately corrected for either care-seeking or insurance-seeking 
selection bias, but not both. Since the healthcare costexpenditure of care model can potentially 
suffer from both kinds of biases, a dual-selection model (model 4) is proposed here to jointly 
account for the two selection decisions.  
The model has two selection-correction parts:  
- The first part is an insurance decision model ± this is simply the insurance probit 
model which is presented in the equation below (same as equation 4 before): 
ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ 
This insurance decision model is used to estimate the so-FDOOHG ,QYHUVH 0LOOV¶5DWLR ,05
(ߣ݅) for each person in the sample. IMR represents the unobserved propensity to 
purchase/participate in insurance, given that insurance was available. If, based on known 
characteristics, the predicted probability of insurance-seeking is high and the individual is 
observed to have purchased/participated insurance, then the influence of unobserved variables 
(and hence the IMR) would be small, and vice versa [48]. It can be represented 
mathematically as: 
ߣ௜ ൌ ۖەۖ۔
ۓ Ԅ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ Ȱ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ൘ Ԅ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ ሾ ? െ Ȱ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻሿ൘ ݑ݊݅݊ݏݑݎ݁݀ ሺ ?ሻ 
IMR is then used in the second part of the model (see below) to account for unobserved 
propensity of purchasing/participating in insurance. As before, equation (4) is estimated with 
exclusion restrictions, (instrumental) variables that uniquely predict insurance membership 
but not care-seeking or OOP expenditures (i.e. the second part of this model). 
- The second part is the(4a) insurance decision model; and (4b)  Heckman sample 
selection model for the care-seeking decision ± this is the same as (same as model 2 
(presented earlier) but this time augmented by a correction term known as Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR, see below), which is obtained from the first component of the 
                                                 Addressing care-seeking as well as insurance-seeking selection biases                       
17 
 
model above(a). This IMR term is used as a covariate in both the care-seeking and 
OOP expenditurecost parts of Heckman selection model (model 2). 
Hence, part (4a) of the model is a probit equation (below) for the insurance-seeking decision 
[same as equation 4]. 
ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ 
As before, equation (4) is estimated with exclusion restrictions, i.e. (instrumental) variables 
that uniquely predict insurance membership but not care-seeking and OOP cost outcomes. 
This equation is then used to calculate the IMR for the insurance decision as below. 
ߣ௜ ൌ ۖەۖ۔
ۓ Ԅ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ Ȱ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ൘ Ԅ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ ሾ ?െ Ȱ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻሿ൘ ݑ݊݅݊ݏݑݎ݁݀ ሺ ?ሻ 
IMR represents the unobserved propensity to seek insurance, given that insurance was 
available. If, based on known characteristics, the predicted probability of insurance-seeking is 
high and the individual is observed to have sought insurance, then the influence of 
unobserved variables (and hence the IMR) would be small, and vice versa [40]. 
Part (4b) of the model is the Heckman sample selection model (the same as model 2). 
However, this time both the care-seeking and cost of care equations also include the IMR 
term from the insurance probit. The reason for using IMR from the selection (insurance) 
equation in the outcome equation is that selection bias is essentially an omitted variable bias, 
which occurs due to unobserved factors that predict insurance decision and are also correlated 
with care-seeking decision and OOP expenditurecost. Inclusion of the IMR term as a 
covariate in the care-seeking and OOP expenditurecost equations helps to capture the 
correlation between unobserved predictors of insurance and outcome equations and therefore 
helps to correct for the selection bias. If the IMR in the costexpenditure equation is significant 
and negative, it implies a negative correlation between unobservables in the insurance 
participation and OOP expenditurecost. In other words, unobserved factors that decrease 
insurance participation will also tend to reduce OOP costexpenditure. Hence, the final 
costhealthcare expenditure of care equation accounts for the insurance-seeking selection 
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through the inclusion of the IMR from the first part (4a) of the model (i.e. the insurance 
probit) and also accounts for care-seeking selection by jointly estimating the costexpenditure 
and care-seeking equations in the second part to allow for error correlation.  
The final care-seeking and OOP expenditurecost equations are estimated jointly using 
Heckman¶V VDPSOH VHOHFWLRQ FRUUHFWLRQ maximum likelihood model approach can be 
represented as: 
ሾܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௭ܼ௜ ൅ ߚ௦ܫܯܴ ൅ߝ௜௖௦ሻሺ ?ሻ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ȁሺܿܽݎ݁ െ ݁ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ  ?ሻൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߚ௖ܫܯܴ ൅ߝ௜௧ ሺ ? ?ሻ 
Here equation (9) is the care seeking selection equation, while equation (10) is the 
expenditure equation conditional on care having being observed/sought . Both equations 
include IMR as covariate to account for unobserved predictors of the insurance decision. 
These equations are estimated jointly using Heckman maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure. 
 
4. RESULTS 
This section starts by describing the raw data, comparing unadjusted mean differences in 
healthcare costexpenditure between insured and uninsured groups by socioeconomic groups, 
before turning to the econometric results. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
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The descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Appendix A1. Most 
respondents were residents of rural areas and 41% of them were farmers by profession. The 
insured made up 20.25% of the sick sample, and were likely to be more educated and in hired 
employment. Figure 1 summarises health care costexpenditures as proportions of total 
household consumption expenditure. As one would expect, although richer quintile groups 
incurred higher costexpenditures of care in absolute monetary terms, the proportion of income 
sacrificed was substantially lower than in the poorest quintile groups. The figure shows that 
the proportionate shares were consistently lower for the insured group. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
4.2 Regression results 
The regression models used in this study estimate the impact of insurance membership on the 
healthcare costexpenditure of health care. The analysis was carried out using Stata version 
12.1. The unit of analysis was an individual for whom the questionnaire was completed. 
Table 1 presents the main results from the costexpenditure models.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The OLS analysis was carried out on all individuals who reported illness over the past three 
months. The observed costexpenditure for those who did not seek care was zero. The OLS 
model takes both zero and non-zero values as costexpenditures, and does not explicitly model 
the care-seeking decision. The OLS model passed the Ramsey RESET test with test score F 
(3, 1,164) = 0.32 and p > F = 0.81, and had an R-squared value of 0.25. OLS results show a 
statistically significant negative effect of insurance membership on the log of health care 
costexpenditure [Table 1]. After the transformation in equation (6), the OLS model estimates 
that insurance membership reduced OOP expenditurescosts by 51.3% (see figure 2). 
Regression results also show that the socioeconomic status of an individual is positively 
related to their observed healthcare costexpenditure of care, suggesting positive income 
elasticity which makes intuitive sense. CostExpenditure onf health care was also observed to 
have a strong positive relationship with inpatient admissions and long-term health care status. 
Patients who self-assessed their health as fairly bad, or those who were suffering from long-
term illness, incurred substantially higher costexpenditure than those in good health.  
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The OLS model does not correct for potential care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection 
bias. Following Waters (1999) [49], we tested for the presence of care-seeking and insurance-
seeking selection biases by separately introducing the predicted probabilities from the care-
seeking and insurance-seeking probit models into the OLS model. Statistically significant 
coefficients (care-seeking: p = 0.02; insurance-seeking: p = 0.00) indicated the presence of 
selection biases. 
+HFNPDQ¶VVDPSOHVHOHFWLRQPRGHO(model 2) is employed to allow for care-seeking selection 
by joint estimation of cost healthcare expenditure of care and care-seeking equations. The 
coefficient on insurance in the Heckman model was much higher at -0.949 compared to -
0.676 in the OLS model [Table 1], suggesting that the correlation between the residuals of the 
care-seeking probit and cost healthcare expenditure of care models should not be ignored. The 
rho parameter for independence of the care-seeking and costexpenditure equations in the 
sample selection model was weakly significant (p = 0.06). After the transformation based on 
equation [6], the impact of insurance was estimated to be 63.1% (see figure 2). The 
coefficient on log of consumption expenditure also showed a small increase after correction 
for care-seeking bias. We also evaluated the coefficients in the care-seeking equation in the 
model that suggest that socioeconomic and insurance status does not significantly influence 
the decision to seek care [Table 2], although insurance significantly reduces the cost 
healthcare expenditure of care when treatment is sought. 
Model 3 is the treatment effects model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of the 
insurance decision. This model has been commonly employed in the literature and aims to 
correct for insurance selection bias by independently identifying insurance-seeking decision 
whilst jointly estimating the cost healthcare expenditure of care model. However, the model 
ignores any potential care-seeking selection bias. The insurance-seeking equation was 
identified using instrumental variables that identify the insurance-seeking process. Following 
Waters (1999) [49], the appropriateness of the identifying variables was tested by introducing 
the identifying variables on the right hand side of a reduced form probit equation for the 
insurance-seeking decision. Statistically significant coefficients on identifying variables 
indicated that the variables were appropriate candidates. Subsequently, the identifying 
variables were included on the right hand side of the healthcare costexpenditure of care model 
to establish that they did not significantly predict the costexpenditure model.  
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The coefficient on the insurance variable in model 3 was -1.086, compared to -0.676 in the 
OLS model, suggesting that the OLS model had underestimated the impact of insurance 
membership on healthcare costexpenditure of care. Following equation [6], the impact of 
insurance on healthcare the costexpenditure of care was estimated to be 69.0% (see figure 2).  
The rho parameter for independence of the insurance-seeking and costexpenditure equations 
in the sample selection model was statistically significant (p = 0.01) indicating significant 
correlation between the residuals of the insurance-seeking probit and healthcare 
costexpenditure of care models. We also evaluated the coefficients in the insurance-seeking 
equation in the model that suggest that years of schooling and rural residence were positively 
associated with insurance seeking decision, while female gender, wage employment and 
chronic illness were negatively associated with the insurance-seeking decision. The 
coefficients on identifying variables suggest that the insurance decision was indeed positively 
associated with medium to high level of worry about future health, membership of mass 
organisation and knowledge about the benefits of VHI and where to get the membership card. 
Models 2 and 3 account for either care-seeking or insurance-seeking selection decisions but 
not both. Model 4 aims simultaneously to account for the two types of selection decisions by 
introducing the IMR termfrom the insurance probit (the first part of model 4) into the 
Heckman sample selection equations in the second part of the model (i.e. the healthcare 
costexpenditure of care and care-seeking equations). IMR and its squared and cubic forms 
have different levels of statistical significance in the selection part of the model. Large values 
of the t-ratio associated with the IMR term suggest the presence of sample selection bias [50].  
Results from model 4 show that the effect of IMR in the healthcare costexpenditure of care 
model was positive and concave, suggesting that the unobservable factors associated with the 
insurance decision are associated with higher healthcare costexpenditures of care but at a 
diminishing rate. In the care-seeking model, IMR was found to have a negative effect on the 
probability of seeking care. The Wald statistic for independence of the care-seeking and cost 
healthcare expenditure of care equations rejected the null-hypothesis of no correlation [p>z = 
0.01]. Most importantly, the coefficient on insurance membership in model 4 was -1.238 
compared to -0.676 in the OLS model, suggesting that the naïve model significantly 
underestimated the impact of insurance by ignoring selection biases. When the coefficient was 
transformed using equation [6], the magnitude of the impact was 72.3% compared to 51.3% 
estimated in the OLS model (see figure 2). This shows that not accounting for the selection 
biases underestimated the impact of voluntary insurance by 21 percentage points. 
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(Figure 2 about here) 
5. DISCUSSION 
This paper develops an approach to account simultaneously for insurance-seeking and care-
seeking selection biases in modelling the impact of VHI on health care costexpenditures.  We 
illustrate these methods using survey data on the impact of a Vietnamese voluntary health 
insurance programme on individual out-of-pocket health care costexpenditures. The naïve 
OLS model suffers from important selection biases due to care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
decisions. This is because correlation between the costexpenditure on of care and unobserved 
determinants of the care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions is likely to produce biased 
estimates. Although previous studies have allowed for insurance-seeking selection bias, these 
studies have not allowed for simultaneous care-seeking selection. The contribution of this 
paper is to propose and illustrate a method for simultaneously allowing for both forms of 
selection bias.  In our illustrative example, we use four different econometric models to 
compare the results of naive OLS against models allowing for each form of bias, both 
separately and jointly. 
Results from the naïve OLS model suggest that insurance membership reduces out of pocket 
costexpenditure by 51.3%. When both insurance-seeking and care-seeking decisions were 
taken into account, however, the impact of insurance on reducing health care costexpenditures 
increased to 72.3%. Moreover, results also confirmed the presence of correlation between 
health care costexpenditure and unobserved determinants of the selection decisions.  
The relative magnitude of the impact of the two selection decisions on insurance coefficients 
in the costexpenditure model will depend on the level of selection bias in a particular study. 
The care-seeking bias is important in the case of low-income countries with predominantly 
out-of-pocket healthcare systems where the decision to seek care is often correlated with the 
expected healthcare costexpenditure. The impact of correcting for care-seeking bias is likely 
to be higher when insurance status is a strong predictor of the care-seeking decision, i.e. the 
insured have a higher probability of seeking care when ill. This was not found to be the case 
in the illustrated example of Vietnam, but other studies in other contexts have found that the 
insured are more likely to seek care when ill and to seek care from higher-level providers [18] 
which would result in higher costexpenditures in the insured group.  
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We compared our results with Jowett et al (2003) [24] who used the same data but only 
corrected for insurance selection but ignored the care-seeking selection bias. The final 
coefficient of the impact of insurance on OOP expenditurescosts was higher in Jowett et al, 
i.e. -1.6 compared to our final estimate of -1.24. This is because they estimated the impact of 
insurance for individuals who sought care, and therefore benefitted more from insurance 
membership in terms of reduction in OOP expenditurescosts. Therefore, the estimate from 
Jowett et al  [24] is not generalisable to the wider population who need health care, and is also 
not directly comparable to our estimates. 
Our illustrative analysis found that socioeconomic status had a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with out of pocket health care costexpenditures. However, richer 
quintile groups were found to pay less as a percentage of their total consumption expenditure, 
consistent with the findings in other studies of Vietnam[51, 52]. This mirrors broader 
concerns about inequity in health care financing in low-income countries that have been 
extensively discussed in the literature [53] [30] [54]. 
The study also finds that insurance membership did not have a statistically significant impact 
on the probability of care-seeking, suggesting that other factors may play an important role in 
the care-seeking decision. One such factor may be geographical access to health services, 
since province of residence is associated with the care-seeking decision. 94.05% of the sick 
residents of Dong Thap sought care, compared to 66% and 86% of residents from Hai Phong 
and Ninh Binh provinces, respectively. 
We also modelled the probability of health insurance uptake, which was found to be 
positively associated with the socioeconomic status of an individual.  Richer individuals were 
more likely to purchase insurance, and in turn to benefit from costexpenditure reduction. This 
is likely to have equity implications, especially if the insurance fund is subsidised through 
government funding.  
Our study uses data on a relatively small health insurance programme targeting just three 
provinces of Vietnam to illustrate our method of accounting for double selection bias. 
However, the issue of double selection bias is also likely to occur in larger programme 
evaluations with broader populations.  Indeed, one might anticipate that as programmes target 
and evaluate broader populations the insurance-seeking element of bias may reduce ± because 
there is less scope for selection ± whereas the care-seeking element of bias may increase.  
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This is because broader programmes are likely to include older, sicker and more 
disadvantaged populations who are likely to face greater care-seeking barriers. Moreover, 
selection biases also depend on the type of coverage and benefits of health insurance 
programme as well as the study context. For instance, while compulsory health insurance 
programmes are generally not affected by insurance-seeking adverse selection, they may still 
suffer from care-seeking selection issue. In case of Vietnam, Sepehri et al (2011) evaluated 
both compulsory health insurance (CHI) and voluntary health insurance (VHI) programmes 
and found that the impact of CHI on reducing OOP healthcare expenditure was higher than 
VHI. This may be partly because VHI is more likely to be influenced by adverse selection. 
Similarly, coverage (such as type of services and health facilities covered) and level of 
insurance co-payment may also the impact of insurance and the influence insurance-seeking 
and care-seeking selection biases.  
In case of Vietnam, Recently, a number of few studies have used a larger national dataset 
from different waves of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) to evaluate 
the impact of different types of health insurance programmes. Appendix table A3 summarises 
the methods and results of studies evaluating the impact of health insurance in Vietnam. 
These studies evaluate one or more of the following insurance programmes in Vietnam: (1) 
voluntary health insurance (VHI); (2) compulsory health insurance (CHI); (3) Vietnam Health 
Care Fund for the Poor (VHCFP); and (4) free healthcare for children under 6 years. These 
studies come to different conclusions which are summarised here. have come to different 
conclusions using data from different waves of this survey: for instance, Sepehri et al. (2006) 
[25] evaluated both VHI and CHI together using VHLSS for 1992-3 and 1997-8 and corrected 
for care-seeking bias using Tobit model (fixed and random effects) but not accounting for 
insurance endogeneity. They found that insurance reduce OOP expenditurecosts by 17% to 
20%. Jowett et al (2003) used the same dataset as our study (i.e. survey of three provinces in 
year 1999), and corrected for insurance endogeneity but not care-seeking bias (and only used 
positive OOP expenditure observations). They found that VHI significantly reduced OOP 
expenditure, although their coefficients are much larger than ours results because they only 
used observations with positive OOP expenditures (therefore, their model results cannot be 
generalised to the wider population). Finally, Nguyen (2012) [6] evaluated the impact of VHI 
using VHLSS 2004 and 2006 using PSM and double differencing (i.e. difference-in-
difference) to account for insurance selection and found that the effect of VHI on OOP 
expenditures is not statistically significant; however, they found that insurance increases the 
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annual outpatient and inpatient visits by 45% and 70% respectively which partly explains no 
statistically significant reduction in OOP expenditure despite insurance reducing the price of 
care. 
Wagstaff (2007) [55] evaluated VHCFP programme in Vietnam using VHLSS 2004 wave 
using propensity score matching (PSM) for insurance selection and found that it did not 
reduce the average out-of-pocket expenditure because it increased the probability and number 
of inpatient and outpatient visits. The same programme was evaluated by Axelson et al (2009) 
using PSM followed by double differencing for insurance endogeneity, and by Wagstaff 
(2010) using PSM followed by triple differencing to account for both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity (see Appendix for details). Axelson et al (2009) found that VHCFP 
reduced only inpatient OOP but not overall expenditure, while Wagstaff (2010) found that 
VHCFP reduced both inpatient OOP and total OOP expenditures. Finally, Sepehri et al 
(2011) evaluated CHI, VHI and VHCFP using VHLSS waves 2004 and 2006 using fixed and 
random effects models and found that CHI and VHI reduced OOP expenditure at district 
hospitals by 40% and 32% respectively but did not reduce expenditure for those using 
commune health centres. 
The above studies account for observables, and in most cases also unobservable, of the 
insurance-seeking decision (through PSM or regression with/without difference-in-difference 
methods). However, none of these studies simultaneously accounted for care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking biases which may partly explain some of these differences in findings and 
Nguyen (2012) [6] found that the effect of insurance on OOP was not statistically significant. 
It is therefore perhaps unfortunate that recent studies using larger data in Vietnam have only 
adjusted for insurance-seeking bias and not also for care-seeking bias which may partly 
explain some of these differences [56].  
The focus of our study was on selection on unobservables, while also accounting for 
observable differences using regression model. As noted earlier, We note that selection on 
observables can be dealt with using different approaches, with regression and matching 
methods being the most popular in the literature. The debate on regression versus matching to 
control for observables is not yet settled, with some authors concluding that the difference 
between estimates is not likely to be of major empirical significance [29]. The advantage of 
matching over regression is that it matches individuals based on their propensity to buy 
insurance by restricting the sample to observations that are comparable (at least in terms of 
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observed characteristics). Moreover, the matching methods make fewer assumptions about 
model specification. However, if the distribution of observed characteristics is similar in the 
insured and uninsured groups, and there is complete overlap between the two groups in terms 
of the range of propensity score (i.e. they have common support), then regression analysis will 
not rely on predicting expected outcomes based on observed characteristics beyond the ranges 
of observable characteristics in the insured and uninsured groups. We found in our data that 
respondent characteristics were similar for most observed characteristics, and more 
importantly, the predicted propensity for insurance had complete overlap (i.e. common 
support). Based on this, the choice of method for dealing with observable difference is 
unlikely to be significant in this study. Moreover, neither regression nor matching account for 
selection on unobservables. Finally, our proposed approach for selection on unobservables 
can be easily applied to matching methods using weighted propensity score method. 
There are also other econometric approaches available in the literature that account for 
selection on unobservables [57] [58]. At least one of them, i.e. the instrumental variable 
DSSURDFK KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WR EH HTXLYDOHQW WR +HFNPDQ¶V VDPSOH VHOHFWLRQ PRGHO when 
selection decision is binary (which is the case in this study) [59]. Further research can explore 
if using other selection models produce similar results. 
The modelling approach used in this study is relevant to non-randomised settings evaluating 
the effect on insurance on OOP expenditures. Randomised studies, such as the RAND health 
insurance experiment [60], which allocated individuals to different health insurance plans, are 
likely to have balanced groups in terms of their unobserved propensity to seek care (by virtue 
of randomisation). As a result, the average treatment effect can be estimated without the need 
to account for selection biases. However, most health insurance studies are not randomised, 
and therefore need to consider the issue of care seeking selection bias. Allowing for sample 
selection bias implies estimates can be generalised to individuals who did not seek care [61], 
which addresses the impoUWDQW TXHVWLRQ RI µ:KDW ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ WKH HIIHFWV RI KHDOWK
LQVXUDQFHKDGWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOVVRXJKWFDUH"¶. 
The study has some limitations. Firstly, identification of the care-seeking equation relied on 
non-OLQHDULW\RIWKHLQYHUVH0LOO¶VUDWLR. Whilst this is the common practice when instrumental 
variables are not available [50], the care-seeking decision may be better identified with unique 
instrumental variables. For the insurance-seeking selection, we used instrumental variables, 
though of course identification is only as good as the instrumental variables used. Secondly, 
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+HFNPDQ¶V VHOHFWLRQPRGHO DVVXPHVELYDULDWHQRUPDOLW\RI HUURU WHUPVRI the selection and 
outcome equations. The consequences of violation of this assumption should be explored in 
future work. Thirdly, whilst our proposed approach controls for the first hurdle, i.e. the care-
seeking decision, it did not completely control for the quantity and quality of healthcare 
received. In a case study of China, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) [18] found that insurance 
encouraged individuals to seek care and to seek care from higher-level providers, which will 
have an effect of the estimation of true impact of insurance on OOP expenditurecosts. Finally, 
insurance premiums were unknown for most respondents and, hence, were not included in the 
analysis. This means that all models will   over-estimate the impact of voluntary insurance; 
however, the overestimation is unlikely to be substantial, given the low level of premiums 
relative to average health costexpenditures amongst the insured. 
In conclusion, when access to health care is determined primarily by ability to pay, out-of-
pocket payments are one of the most significant barriers to health care access, resulting in an 
inequitable distribution of health and health service utilisation [44] [62]. Hence, evaluation of 
the impact of VHI and other schemes on reducing out of pocket costexpenditures is important, 
in order to find both costexpenditure-effective and equitable ways of extending financial 
protection mechanisms to improve access to health care.  This study has developed a method 
for allowing simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases, and 
has highlighted the significance of employing unbiased econometric models for estimating the 
impact of health insurance on the healthcare costexpenditure of care. In the context of low-
income countries, where substantial numbers of individuals may be deterred from seeking 
care due to geographical and financial barriers to access, it is important to allow for care-
seeking selection bias as well as insurance-seeking selection bias. Finally, our method can be 
generalised to evaluation of other types of health insurance programmes (such as social 
insurance) if they include an element of choice for the enrolment and care-seeking decisions 
that can be influenced by expected future healthcare costexpenditures. 
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Figure 1: OOP health care expenditure cost as percentage of total consumption 
expenditure 
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Figure 2: Impact of insurance membership on out-of-pocket healthcare costexpenditure 
of care 
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Table 1: Results of econometric analysis of Models ofhealthcare the costexpenditure of 
health care 
Dependent variable: 
Log of individual level 
healthcare 
costexpenditure of health 
care 
Model 1: OLS 
Model 2: sample 
selection model 
allowing for care-
seeking selection 
Model 3 - 
Treatment 
effects model 
allowing for 
insurance-
selection 
Model 4: Sample 
selection model 
allowing for both 
care-seeking and 
insurance-selection 
Member of VHI 
programme 
-0.676** -0.949*** -1.086*** -1.238*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Log of equivalent annual 
household expenditure 
0.419** 0.459*** 0.437** 0.488*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.002 
(0.65) (0.71) (0.75) (0.90) 
Age-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.76) (0.66) (0.87) (0.82) 
Female 0.041 -0.184 0.033 -0.193 
(0.91) (0.51) (0.93) (0.51) 
Interaction between age 
and sex 
0.004 0.010 0.005 0.010 
(0.59) (0.14) (0.56) (0.13) 
No. of illnesses in last 3 
months 
-0.028 0.010 -0.029 0.010 
(0.65) (0.84) (0.63) (0.83) 
Inpatient admission in last 
3 months 
2.332*** 2.488*** 2.320*** 2.467*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Health status: fairly good 0.061 -0.201 0.031 -0.243 
 (0.82) (0.46) (0.91) (0.39) 
Health status: fairly bad 0.800** 0.721*** 0.796*** 0.700** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Health status: long-term  0.909** 0.698* 0.906** 0.675* 
Illness (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) 
Chronic illness 0.099 0.103 0.077 0.076 
 (0.76) (0.72) (0.80) (0.78) 
Rural residence 0.304 0.317 0.316* 0.332* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Province: Hai Phong -0.524 -0.008 -0.549 -0.004 
 (0.23) (0.99) (0.20) (0.99) 
Province: Ninh Binh 0.011 0.144 -0.017 0.115 
 (0.96) (0.62) (0.93) (0.68) 
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Occupation: service 0.270 0.385** 0.250 0.350* 
(0.28) (0.03) (0.31) (0.05) 
Occupation: farmer 0.021 -0.040 -0.004 -0.077 
(0.90) (0.85) (0.98) (0.72) 
Occupation: wage 
employment 
-0.166 -0.252 -0.185 -0.284 
(0.31) (0.18) (0.24) (0.14) 
Years of schooling -0.022 -0.010 -0.014 -0.002 
(0.53) (0.75) (0.67) (0.96) 
Interaction between 
schooling and gender  
0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 
(0.96) (0.71) (0.95) (0.74) 
Interaction between 
schooling and age 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.50) (0.30) (0.55) (0.34) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - - - 0.471* 
- - - (0.08) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio ± 
squared 
- - - -0.236*** 
- - - (0.00) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - cube-
root 
- - - 0.018 
- - - (0.48) 
Constant -0.635 -0.791 -0.701 -0.892 
(0.66) (0.51) (0.62) (0.45) 
Rho - 1.269* 0.224** 1.197* 
 - (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) 
Sigma - 0.406*** 0.479*** 0.398*** 
 - (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 1189 
R-squared 0.26 - - - 
Robust p values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2: Intermediate probit models of care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions 
Covariates: 
Care-seeking model 
(part of model 2) 
Care-seeking model 
with correction for 
insurance-selection 
(part of model 4) 
Insurance-seeking 
model  
(part of model 3) 
Member of VHI programme -0.254 0.317 - 
(0.33) (0.50) - 
Log of equivalent annual 
household expenditure 
0.185 0.190 0.355* 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.10) 
Age -0.015 -0.013 -0.265*** 
(0.64) (0.68) (0.00) 
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
(0.60) (0.64) (0.00) 
Female 0.259 0.302 -1.333*** 
(0.70) (0.67) (0.00) 
Interaction between age and sex -0.001 -0.001 0.048** 
(0.94) (0.92) (0.03) 
No. of illnesses in last 3 months -0.092 -0.088* - 
(0.10) (0.09) - 
Health status: fairly good 0.416 0.464* -0.525** 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.02) 
Health status: fairly bad 0.334 0.351 0.679* 
 (0.29) (0.23) (0.07) 
Health status: long-term  0.682 0.716 0.590 
Illness (0.29) (0.23) (0.44) 
Chronic illness -0.003 -0.009 -1.720*** 
 (0.99) (0.98) (0.00) 
Rural residence 0.078 0.074 0.988* 
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.08) 
Province: Hai Phong -1.196*** -1.171*** -2.117*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Province: Ninh Binh -0.551* -0.531** -2.080*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) 
Occupation: service 0.039 0.035 -0.838* 
(0.92) (0.93) (0.07) 
Occupation: farmer 0.224 0.241 -0.345 
(0.45) (0.42) (0.58) 
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Occupation: wage employment 1.463 1.539* -1.213** 
(0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
Years of schooling -0.033 -0.037 0.166*** 
(0.59) (0.58) (0.00) 
Interaction between schooling 
and gender  
0.012 0.010 0.029 
(0.83) (0.85) (0.74) 
Interaction between schooling 
and age 
0.000 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.78) (0.77) (0.01) 
Respondent has medium to high 
level of worry about future 
health 
- - 1.888*** 
- - (0.00) 
Member of a mass organisation - - 0.909*** 
- - (0.00) 
Do you know where to go get hi 
card? 
- - 2.432*** 
- - (0.00) 
Do you think or know of any 
benefit of VHI when getting 
medicines? 
- - 0.597*** 
- - (0.01) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - -0.221 - 
- (0.57) - 
Inverse Mills' Ratio ± squared - -0.244** - 
- (0.02) - 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - cube-root - 0.047* - 
- (0.09) - 
Constant 0.270 0.142 -4.885*** 
(0.86) (0.93) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 
Robust p values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendices 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest 
  
Respondents 
reporting 
sickness in the 
last 3 months 
(N=1,192) 
Sick 
respondents 
who sought 
health care 
(N=982) 
Insured 
who were 
also sick  
(N=242) 
Uninsured   
who were 
also sick 
(N=950) 
Variable Name Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Member of Voluntary Health 
Insurance 
(percentage of respondents) 
20.25 17.09 - - 
Age (years) 
 
35.86 35.95 34.80 32.42 
Female 
(percentage of respondents) 55.75 56.70 38.59 56.38 
 
Rural resident 
(percentage of respondents) 
81.81 82.22 72.20 71.65 
 
Resident of Hai Phong 
(percentage of respondents) 
8.32 6.43 31.95 7.17 
 
Resident of Ninh Binh 
(percentage of respondents) 
28.33 27.67 4.98 48.89 
 
Resident of Dong Thap 
(percentage of respondents) 
63.35 65.90 63.07 43.94 
 
Occupation ± service/business 
(percentage of respondents) 
11.55 11.28 8.71 10.33 
 
Occupation ± farmer 
(percentage of respondents) 
41.28 41.12 25.31 29.82 
 
Occupation - hired 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
6.80 7.38 8.30 5.48 
Occupation ± student 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
22.32 21.18 22.82 35.83 
Occupation ± retired 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
7.68 7.36 2.90 6.74 
Occupation - other 
(percentage of respondents) 10.37 11.68 3.32 12.96 
 
Number of years of schooling 
 
5.32 5.18 8.19 6.03 
Health status - good 
(percentage of respondents) 20.27 18.64 37.76 21.29 
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Health status - fairly good 
(percentage of respondents) 
51.54 52.66 37.34 52.90 
     
Health status - fairly bad 
(percentage of respondents) 16.21 16.33 14.11 11.70 
 
Health status - long-term illness 
(percentage of respondents) 
11.99 12.37 10.79 14.12 
 
Chronic illness 
(percentage of respondents) 
14.78 15.16 12.45 13.28 
 
Number of illnesses in the last 3 
months 
2.01 2.02 2.08 1.88 
 
Inpatient care (yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
10.19 9.82 13.25 9.20 
 
 
Table A2: Average health care costexpenditures per person in the last three months (by 
consumption quintiles) 
  
 
Poorest 
quintile 
µ91' 
(N = 239) 
Quintile 2 
µ91' 
(N = 238) 
Quintile 3 
µ91' 
(N = 238) 
Quintile 4 
µ91' 
(N = 240) 
Richest 
quintile 
µ91' 
(N = 236) 
Total 
µ91' 
(N = 1,192) 
 
Insured 29.85 29.86 45.87 52.95 98.99 66.69 
Uninsured 176.40 101.29 356.28 159.15 283.30 212.76 
Average 174.758 98.418 322.697 170.794 268.020 206.091 
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Table A3: Summary of published studies evaluating the impact of health insurance in Vietnam 
Study Data Type of analysis Results 
Jowett et al 
(2003) 
Single cross-sectional 
survey conducted in year 
1999 using purposive 
sampling to evaluate the 
voluntary component of 
9LHWQDP¶VYROXQWDU\
health insurance (VHI) 
programme ± before the 
introduction of Vietnam 
Health Care Fund for the 
Poor (VHCFP). Survey 
conducted in 3 provinces 
(Ninh Binh, Hai Phong 
and Dong Thap). This 
data is the same as used 
in our paper. 
+HFNPDQ¶VWZR-step 
regression was used to correct 
for insurance endogeneity. 
First step was a probit 
regression for probability of 
insurance. Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR) was obtained from this 
model and included in the 
OLS regression for out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenditure. 
The expenditure equation 
included only non-zero values 
for health expenditure; hence, 
care-seeking selection was 
ignored. 
Overall, health insurance was 
found to reduce average out-
of-pocket expenditures. The 
dependent variable was the log 
of out-of-pocket expenditure. 
The coefficient on insurance 
was -2.080 (p=0.001) after 
correcting for insurance 
endogeneity which was 
interpreted incorrectly as 
200% reduction in 
expenditure. 
Sepehri et 
al (2006) 
National data from 1992-
3 and 1997-8 waves of 
the Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey (VLSS) 
WRHYDOXDWH9LHWQDP¶V
health insurance 
programme; however, 
unlike Jowett et al 
(2003), both compulsory 
(predominant) and 
voluntary health 
insurance was included 
and jointly evaluated 
because VLSS did not 
provide distinction 
between the two types. 
Two approaches were used 
with panel individual effect: 
(1) Tobit model which treats 
zero expenditure as censored 
(i.e. censored value for 
selecting into care, not 
insurance); and (2) truncated 
regression which uses only 
positive expenditure. Fixed 
and random effects models 
were used. 
 
Insurance endogeneity bias 
was not taken into account, 
partly because both 
compulsory and voluntary 
insurance was included. 
Random and fixed effects 
models produce different 
results. Final set of results 
show that health insurance 
reduces out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (between 17 and 
20%). 
Wagstaff 
(2007) 
National data from 
VHLSS 2004. The study 
evaluated VHCFP which 
was introduced in 2003. 
Propensity score matching was 
used to account for insurance 
endogeneity, followed by 
regression weighted by 
propensity score weights. 
Total out-of-pocket health 
expenditure is reduced by 
VHCFP in the simple PSM but 
not with the regression. The 
study concluded that VHCFP 
did not reduce average out-of-
pocket expenditure because it 
increased the probability and 
number of inpatient and 
outpatient visits. A secondary 
finding was that VHCFP 
reduced the risk of 
catastrophic spending by 3-
4%. 
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Study Data Type of analysis Results 
Axelson et 
al (2009) 
VHLSS data from 2002 
(pre-VHCFP) and 2004 
(post-VHCFP) 
First analysis used PSM for 
selection into insurance 
followed by single 
differencing (i.e. difference in 
OOP expenditure between 
insured and uninsured at one 
time point) in a cross-section 
analysis of VHLSS 2004. 
Second analysis used PSM 
followed by double 
differencing (or difference-in-
difference, i.e. first calculating 
the mean difference in 
outcome before and after the 
intervention for the insured 
and uninsured groups 
separately, followed by 
calculating the difference 
between the mean differences 
of the two groups). This is 
done using panel dataset for 
VHLSS 2002 and 2004; the 
double differencing is to take 
account of time-invariant 
unobserved factors. 
The result from the double 
differencing differs from 
single-differencing. Single 
differencing found statistically 
significant reduction in OOP 
expenditure at household level 
by 19% (although reduction in 
per capita expenditure of 14% 
was not significant). Results of 
difference-in-difference also 
found reduction in health care 
expenditure but they were only 
significant for inpatient care 
expenditure (absolute 
reduction of 134.6 Vietnamese 
Dong). 
Wagstaff 
(2010) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 
2002, 2004 and 2006 
waves. 
Triple-differencing which 
involves difference-in-
difference over three periods, 
i.e. besides the double 
difference-in-difference 
between insured and uninsured 
(as above), a further difference 
LVWDNHQWRµQHWRXW¶WKH
difference between the same 
groups in the change in mean 
OOP expenditure over an 
earlier period. Instead of 
assuming parallel trends in the 
unobservables for the insured 
and uninsured groups, it 
assumes that the change in 
unobservables for each group 
in the two periods (2002-2004) 
and (2004-2006) is the same. 
This method can be used with 
regression or matching to 
control for observables.  
The proposed method 
estimates programme impact 
on those covered by it but not 
Single-difference with 
matching found no significant 
impact of VHCFP on out-of-
pocket expenditure. Double 
and triple-differencing found 
significant negative impact on 
total OOP expenditure (-181 
 and -327 VND respectively) 
and OOP expenditure on 
inpatient care (-131 and -248 
VND respectively). 
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Study Data Type of analysis Results 
those currently not covered. 
Sepehri et 
al (2011) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 2004 
and 2006 waves. The 
focus is on compulsory 
health insurance (CHI), 
VHI and insurance for the 
poor. 
Fixed and random effects 
models were used. Fixed 
effects analysis was intended 
to control for time-invariant 
unobserved individual effects. 
Endogeneity bias due to 
adverse selection into 
insurance was not taken into 
account. 
Random effects analysis 
showed that CHI and VHI 
reduce OOP expenditure by 
about 24% while health 
insurance for the poor reduces 
it by 15%. However, in the 
fixed effects analysis, the 
coefficients for CHI and VHI 
were not significant. Further 
analysis showed that CHI and 
VHI reduce OOP expenditures 
by 40 and 32%, respectively 
for those using district 
hospitals but not significant 
for commune centres.  
Nguyen 
(2012) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 2004 
and 2006 waves. The 
focus is on voluntary 
health insurance. 
PSM followed by double 
differencing (i.e. difference-in-
difference). 
The effect of voluntary health 
insurance on out ?of ?pocket 
expenditure on health care 
services is not statistically 
significant; however, 
insurance increases the annual 
outpatient and inpatient visits 
by 45% and 70% respectively 
which partly explains no 
statistically significant 
reduction in OOP expenditure 
despite insurance reducing the 
price of care. 
Nguyen and 
Wang 
(2013) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 2004 
and 2006 waves. The 
focus was on evaluating a 
government policy to 
provide free healthcare 
for children younger than 
(?\HDUV7KHSROLF\FDPH
into effect in the 
beginning of 2005. 
Difference-in-difference 
approach using VHLSS wave 
2004 (pre-policy) and 2006 
(post-policy) in a regression 
model controlling for potential 
confounders. 
Free health insurance reduced 
OOP health expenditure by 
US$5.09 in the age group 4-7. 
It also reduced the probability 
of having catastrophic OOP 
expenditure by 1.7 percentage 
point. 
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ABSTRACT 
Health Insurance (HI) programmes in low-income countries aim to reduce the burden of 
individual out-of-pocket (OOP) health care expenditure. However, if the decisions to 
purchase insurance and to seek care when ill are correlated with the expected healthcare 
expenditure, the use of naïve models may produce biased estimates of the impact of insurance 
membership on OOP expenditure. Whilst many studies in the literature have accounted for 
the endogeneity of the insurance decision, the potential selection bias due to the care-seeking 
decision has not been taken into account. We extend the Heckman selection model to account 
simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases in the healthcare 
expenditure regression model. The proposed model is illustrated in the context of a 
Vietnamese HI programme and results compared with those of alternative models making no 
or partial allowance for selection bias.  In this illustrative example, the impact of insurance 
membership on reducing OOP expenditures was underestimated by 21 percentage points 
when selection biases were not taken into account. We believe this is an important 
methodological contribution that will be relevant to future empirical work. 
 
Key words: Health insurance; selection bias; endogeneity; Heckman model; low-income 
countries  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Out of pocket (OOP) payment is the predominant mechanism of health care financing in most 
low-income countries, accounting for over half of the total expenditure on health  in low 
income countries [1]. These payments create financial barriers to health care access, 
especially for the poor, often resulting in long delays in seeking care until disease severity has 
progressed so far that much prolonged and expensive treatment is required [2]. Van Doorslaer 
et al (2007) [3] found that, among Asian countries, reliance on OOP payments was highest in 
Vietnam and India, where >80% of total health expenditures were funded by OOP 
expenditures. In the same study, Vietnam also had the highest proportion of individuals 
incurring catastrophic payments; this was reported to be 34%, 15% and 8.5% at threshold 
levels of 5%, 10% and 15% of total household expenditure. 
In recent decades, many low-income countries have embarked on voluntary health insurance 
(VHI) programmes commonly characterised as not-for-profit, voluntary membership schemes 
with affordable, community-rated premia for all individuals. They may be organised at local 
or regional levels, like SEWA and ACCORD in India [4] and Grameen in Bangladesh [5], or 
at national level, like in Vietnam [6], Ghana [7] and Mexico [8]. The overarching aim of VHI 
programmes is to reduce the burden of out-of-pocket expenditures, and in turn provide 
financial protection to the target population. Based on the same principle, recent policy focus 
has been on providing universal health coverage (UHC) which entitles all people to access 
health care funded through publicly organised risk pooling [9]. Most high income countries 
already have some form of UHC while many middle and low-income countries (LMIC) are 
making significant progress in this direction [10] [11]. However, coverage in most LMICs is 
far from universal, both in terms of enrolment rates and the level of financial protection [11]. 
Moreover, use of care among the enrolled is often restricted by geographical access and co-
payment contributions, resulting in forgone necessary care [12]. 
Several studies in recent years have focused on monitoring progress and evaluating 
effectiveness of various forms of risk pooling in providing financial protection (note: from 
KHUHRQZHZLOOXVHWKHJHQHULFWHUPµhealth insurance¶IRUDOOIRUPVRIULVNSRROLQJ. While 
most studies found a positive effect of health insurance on reducing OOP expenditures [13] 
[8] [14] [15] [16] [17], some studies found mixed, negative or no significant effect [18] [19] 
[20]. Systematic reviews focusing on performance of health insurance have found positive, 
mixed or inconclusive evidence on financial protection [21] [22] [23].  
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To measure the impact of health financing programmes on OOP, robust and consistent 
methods are required. The available evidence on the impact of insurance on OOP 
expenditures may have limitations due to differences in quantitative methodologies employed 
in evaluation studies. It has been noted in the literature that when the analysis is based on 
observed OOP expenditure, it may be biased due to individual-level selection decisions that 
influence the level of incurred expenditure[24] [25] [26]. Two selection decisions are 
particularly important in the context of evaluating the impact of health insurance on OOP 
expenditures in low-income countries. These are insurance-seeking and care-seeking 
selection decisions. Both decisions are determined by observable and unobservable 
characteristics that may also be correlated with expenditure on health care. It is now common 
for studies of the impact of VHI on OOP expenditure to allow for insurance-seeking bias due 
to adverse selection (based on both observable and unobservable characteristics).  However, 
previous studies have not allowed for care-seeking selection bias. This study is innovative in 
allowing simultaneously for these two potential sources of bias. Our study extends the 
selection models to simultaneously correct for selection bias due to insurance-seeking as well 
as care-seeking decisions. The aim of this study is to illustrate this approach to estimate the 
impact of health insurance on OOP expenditure using observational data. We compare the 
results with those of alternative models that allow for selection biases only partially or not at 
all.  For the purpose of illustration, this study uses data from a cross-sectional household 
survey of three provinces of Vietnam, conducted during the year 1999. However, the focus of 
this study is methodological. 
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking selection decisions may potentially bias OOP health care expenditure 
analysis. This is followed by some brief background on the Vietnamese voluntary health 
insurance programme, to help put the empirical results into context. Section 3 discusses the 
data and the econometric models employed in this analysis. Section 4 presents the results of 
econometric analysis, and finally, section 5 discusses the implications of the study findings. 
2. SELECTION BIASES IN MEASURING THE IMPACT OF VHI 
When selection decisions are correlated with the OOP expenditure of health care due to 
observable or unobservable characteristics, as discussed in detail below, the estimate of the 
impact of health insurance on OOP expenditure of care may be biased [27]. One potential 
source of bias is insurance selection. For example, individuals may be more likely to 
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purchase insurance if they expect high future healthcare expenditures, i.e. voluntary insurance 
may be prone to adverse selection. This is also relevant to health financing programmes that 
are moving in the direction of universal health coverage; these programmes often include an 
element of choice for the enrolment decision which can be influenced by expected future 
healthcare expenditures. If so, then the insured may have greater health care needs and in turn 
higher expenditure than the uninsured, even after allowing for observed characteristics such 
as age, sex and self-reported health.  In this case, the mean difference in OOP expenditure 
between insured and uninsured groups will under-estimate the causal impact of VHI on 
reducing OOP health care expenditure. 
A second source of selection bias is attributable to the care-seeking decision.  When an 
individual is sick and in need of health care, they make a decision to seek care or not, i.e. they 
face the care-seeking decision hurdle. For example, individuals may be less likely to seek 
care if they expect the expenditures to be high relative to the benefits, given their household 
financial situation.  This in turn influences whether or not their health care expenditure is 
observed. If the care-seeking decision is correlated with health care expenditures, then not 
accounting for the care-seeking selection in healthcare expenditure model may bias the 
estimates. Moreover, the factors associated with the care seeking decision may be associated 
with the insurance decision. 
Selection bias may occur due to observable or unobservable characteristics (i.e. confounders) 
that are also correlated with the outcome of interest. Selection on observables, such as age 
and gender, can be solved by using regression or matching methods [28]. These are 
FRPPRQO\ NQRZQ DV ³FRQWURO VWUDWHJLHV´ DV WKH\ Fontrol for difference in characteristics 
between those who self-selected and those who did not, to allow causal inference [29].  
However, regression and matching methods do not account for selection on unobservable 
factors that may be correlated with health care expenditures. It is this selection on 
unobservables which is the focus of this paper. For this, the common approaches include 
instrumental variables, control functions and the joint estimation of outcome and selection in 
a structural approach [27]. 
While some studies in the literature have acknowledged but not accounted for potential biases 
due to unobservable characteristics [26, 30], others have corrected for insurance selection 
only and not for care-seeking selection [25] [24] [18] [31]. We start with a more detailed 
discussion of the possible causes and impact of the two forms of selection bias. 
                                                 Addressing care-seeking as well as insurance-seeking selection biases                       
6 
 
2.1. Care-seeking selection and its impact on OOP expenditure 
Care-seeking selection bias is a form of sample selection bias that occurs when the outcome 
of interest (in this case, the health care expenditure) is only observed for a sub-sample of the 
population that meets some criterion defined with respect to a selection decision (in this case, 
the care-seeking decision), and this selection decision is in turn associated with the outcome 
of interest [32] [33]. Hence, in the case of health care expenditure analysis, only a subsample 
of the sick population may seek care and in turn incur health care expenditures. If the care-
seeking decision is not random but is associated with the expected healthcare expenditure, 
then we have selection problem. However, if all determinants of care-seeking decision (that 
are correlated with the outcome) are observed and included in the outcome (OOP expenditure) 
regression, then we have accounted for this selection bias. On the other hand, if the decision 
to seek care  is correlated with OOP expenditure through unobserved factors, then the 
estimated coefficients in the expenditure model (including the coefficient on insurance 
membership), based on observed expenditure, may be biased. Not accounting for this 
selection will result in coefficient estimation based on a non-random sample. As a result, the 
observed effect of insurance on OOP expenditure will not be generalisable to the population 
who did not seek care. Therefore, to evaluate the policy impact of expanding insurance 
coverage (and hence access to care) to the entire population, it is important to account for 
selection bias induced by care seeking. 
For example, DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHJUHHRIrisk aversion with respect to health outcomes may be 
an unobserved factor associated with a higher probability of seeking care given illness and 
also with lower expenditure when care is sought. To put this the other way around, the 
subsample of individuals who seek care and have positive expenditures may be more risk 
averse and face relatively low expenditures of care. Hence, if risk attitude is not taken into 
account, health care expenditure may be under-estimated when extrapolating estimates of 
effects to the wider population of potential health care users.  Secondly, because insurance 
reduces the price of health care and therefore increases the demand for health care, the insured 
may be more likely to seek care and in turn have  their positive health care expenditures 
observed. If so, then the expenditure analysis will under-estimate the impact of expanding 
VHI to the wider population, on reducing OOP healthcare expenditures when care is sought. 
Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) [18] found evidence of this during analysis of three household 
surveys in China. They found that after controlling for insurance-seeking bias, insurance 
membership was associated with an increased risk of high healthcare spending. They 
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concluded that this is because insurance increased the probability of seeking care when ill 
which resulted in higher expenditures in the insured group; therefore, an evaluation of the 
impact of voluntary insurance should take account of care-seeking behaviour.  
In a systematic review of insurance studies in developing countries, Acharya et al (2012) [21] 
found that care-seeking selection is not commonly addressed in the literature. Most studies 
ignore this by either using only the positive expenditure in the analysis [24], or treating zero 
and non-zero expenditures on the same scale without addressing the selection issue. Other 
insurance studies take a two-part modelling approach, separating the probability of seeking 
care from health care expenditure (conditional on seeking care). The following approaches 
have been used in the insurance literature in developing countries [21]: Tobit model, two-part 
models and selection models. These models include the care-seeking decision in the first part 
followed by health expenditure equation in the second part. 
 
There is a strong case for separating the probability of seeking care from health care 
expenditure to assess the extensive margin i.e. decisions to seek care and impact on demand 
for contact with the health care service, which relies mainly on individual circumstances or 
preferences, degree of insurance coverage and access to health care services. This is then 
followed by evaluating the intensive margin which is primarily an agency relationship where 
treatment decisions are made by the treating physician, and influenced by the organisation, 
quality, prices and incentives in the health care system. 
Separating out the contributions of health insurance in extensive and intensive margins on 
out-of-pocket expenditures is important. For instance, total OOP expenditure could increase if 
the extensive margin (threshold for seeking care) decreases, as greater frequency of treatment 
increases total expenditure. However, the impact of decreasing threshold on OOP expenditure 
once care is sought could also be negative if, for instance, more timely care due to lower 
threshold for care seeking impacts severity of illness when care is sought and treatment needs 
(due to more timely intervention). On the other hand, having insurance could affect treatment 
decisions of the physician and patients, i.e. prescription of more intensive and/or expensive 
treatments  or the patient is exposed to risk of supplier induced demand (as observed in case 
of China [18]). Therefore, it is important to explore the influence of these different factors on 
health care expenditures, which the selection model intrinsically enables by estimating the 
propensity to seek care and indicating how this impacts expenditures once care is sought. 
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To understand all this mathematically, let the health care expenditure model be expressed as: 
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௒ሺ ?ሻ 
Here ܺ is a vector of observed variables and ߝ௜௒ represents the unobserved predictors of 
expenditure. Expenditure is only observed to be positive if an individual seeks health care, i.e. 
expenditure depends on an endogenous care-seeking decision (ܥ ௜ܵ) such that: 
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൜ൌ ൅ݒ݁݂݅ܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ ܻ݁ݏൌ  ?݂݅ܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ ܰ݋  ሺ ?ሻ 
The probability of care-seeking, in turn, can be estimated as a probit model (3): 
ሾܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௭ܼ௜ ൅ߝ௜௖௦ሻሺ ?ሻ 
Here Ȱ represents the distribution of probit model and ܼ represents the observed predictors of 
care-seeking decision, including insurance status. Expenditure is positive if latent 
propensityሺߚ௭ܼ௜) to seek care exceeds the unobserved threshold for an individual. 
If the unobserved predictors in the error terms of equations (1) and (3) are not independent of 
each other, then it implies that the observed expenditure on health care (and the estimated 
coefficients in expenditure regression) depends on the care-seeking process. This endogenous 
dependence of the error term violates one of the fundamental assumptions of least squares 
regression and gives rise to sample selection bias. Heckman (1977) [34] explains that this 
selection bias stems from the common problem of omitted variable bias, i.e. a situation 
whereby the model is missing one or more important predictors that are correlated with the 
selection decision as well as the outcome equation. The presence of omitted variable bias is 
then compensated by over- or under-estimating the coefficients of the observed factors in the 
model, such as the insurance variable in this case. As a result, estimated effects on the impacts 
of health insurance on OOP expenditures are unlikely to be generalisable to the wider 
population who were not observed to incur OOP expenditure. 
2.2. Insurance-seeking selection 
Voluntary health insurance programmes often attract sicker or more risk-averse individuals, 
i.e. insurance-purchase/participation decision is not randomly distributed in the population. 
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While regression analysis can control for age, sex and other observed factors, it cannot allow 
IRUXQREVHUYHGDVSHFWVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VKHDOWKSUHIHUHQFHVDQGHQYLURQPHQWWKDWLQIOXHQFH
both health care expenditures and the insurance-purchase/participation decision. Insurance 
status may influence both the care-seeking decision and the healthcare expenditure. If part of 
this influence occurs through the unobserved determinants of the insurance-
purchase/participation decision that are correlated with healthcare expenditure equation, then 
insurance status is not exogenous to the model. This would violate the classical exogeneity 
assumption of linear regression, and the model would suffer from endogeneity bias. 
A number of approaches have been used in the literature to adjust for selection bias due to 
insurance-purchase/participation decision. These methods can be classified based on whether 
they deal with selection on observable covariates (or simply observables) or unobservable 
covariates (or unobservables) [27]. Selection on observables is commonly addressed using 
regression analysis or propensity score matching [21]. The debate on regression versus 
matching to control for observables is not yet settled, with some authors concluding that the 
difference between estimates is not likely to be of major empirical significance [29]. The 
advantage of matching over regression is that it matches individuals based on their propensity 
to buy insurance by restricting the sample to observations that are comparable (at least in 
terms of observed characteristics). Moreover, matching methods make fewer assumptions 
about model specification. However, if the distribution of observed characteristics is similar 
in the insured and uninsured groups, and there is complete overlap between the two groups in 
terms of the range of propensity scores (i.e. they have common support), then regression 
analysis will not rely on predicting expected outcomes based on observed characteristics 
beyond the ranges of observable characteristics in the insured and uninsured groups, and will 
give similar results to regression analysis. 
For selection on unobservables of insurance-seeking decision, a number of methods exist in 
the literature. These include structural models and control functions; instrumental variables; 
regression discontinuity; and difference-in-difference [27]. Structural models involve 
specifying a model to determine treatment assignment and then jointly estimating this model 
with the outcome (i.e. OOP expenditure). Control function approach involves separately 
estimating the outcome equation, and capturing insurance selection bias by including a control 
term NQRZQ DV ,QYHUVH 0LOOV¶ 5DWLR H[SODLQHG ODWHU IURP D SURELW PRGHO IRU LQVXUDQFH
selection [34]. This approach was taken by Jowett et al (2003) [24]. Instrumental variable 
approach is based on finding one or more variables that predict treatment (insurance) 
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assignment but are not directly correlated with the outcome (OOP expenditure). This 
approach has been used by a number of studies, including Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) 
[18]. Regression discontinuity design is used when assignment to treatment changes 
discontinuously with respect to some threshold value which determines whether someone is in 
the treated (insured) or untreated (uninsured) group. This approach was used by Bauhoff et al 
(2011) [35] and Miller et al (2009) [36]. Difference-in-difference approach (or double 
differencing) involves taking the difference in outcome (i.e. OOP expenditure) between 
insured and uninsured groups before and after the introduction of insurance and then taking 
the difference in these differences. This approach requires data in both pre-treatment and post-
treatment periods and can be used with longitudinal/panel data or with multiple cross-sections 
[37] [38]). This approach has been commonly used in the literature to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with the insurance decision (see below). 
Selection into insurance based on both observables and unobservables can be simultaneously 
dealt with by combining the above methods. For instance, regression-based models that deal 
with unobservables (such as Heckman sample selection model) also account for selection on 
observables by including observed covariates in the OOP expenditure regression model 
(Jowett et al 2003) [24]. Another common example of jointly addressing selection on 
observable and unobservables is by combining propensity score matching (for selection on 
observables) and difference-in-difference method (for selection on unobservables). For 
example, Axelson et al (2009) [39] use propensity score matching to control for observable 
differences between insured and uninsured, and difference-in-difference approach to control 
for time-invariant unobserved factors that may be correlated with outcomes. This approach 
has been commonly used in the insurance literature [19] [40] [41] [42]. Wagstaff et al (2010) 
[43] extend this approach by combining propensity score matching with triple differencing 
which involves subtracting two previous difference-in-differences in outcome measures from 
two later difference-in-differences measures using available data for three periods.  
However, the methods discussed above only account for differences in unobservables in one 
of the two decisions (generally the insurance-seeking decision) but not both. 
To put this mathematically, the insurance-seeking decision can be represented by a probit 
model: 
ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ 
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Here ܸ represents the predictors of insurance-seeking decision. Selection bias arises when 
there is correlation the error terms in equation 4 and equation 1, or between the error terms in 
equation 4 and equation 3.  
Finally, the unobserved factors associated with the care seeking decision may be associated 
with the purchase of insurance. This paper proposes a regression-based method to account 
simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases. 
3. DATA AND METHODS  
For the purpose of illustrating our methods, we use household survey data from Vietnam 
collected in the year 1999. These data were originally analysed by Jowett et al (2003) [24].  
However, those authors only accounted for insurance-purchase/participation selection and did 
not take account of care-seeking selection bias. Our study illustrates how to jointly account 
for both insurance-purchase/participation and care-seeking selection biases. We provide a 
short paragraph of background on the Vietnamese health insurance programme below, to help 
readers understand the policy context of this illustrative empirical analysis. 
Vietnam introduced health sector reforms in the 1980s, which resulted in the introduction of 
user fees for services that were previously available free of charge. Between 1993 and 1998, 
public sector user fees rose by over 1,000% in real terms. During the same time period, fees 
for private health professionals rose by almost 600%. In 1993, Vietnam introduced its health 
insurance programme, which included compulsory health insurance for civil servants, and 
voluntary health insurance (the subject of this analysis) for formal and informal sector 
employees, the unemployed and children. In 1998, about 12% of the Vietnamese population 
were covered by the insurance programme, with a little over half covered by the VHI 
programme [44].  
3.1. Data 
The data and sampling methods are described in detail in Jowett et al (2003) [24] and briefly 
summarised here. Data were collected through one-to-one questionnaire-based interviews 
conducted in three provinces with reasonably high membership rates, i.e. Hai Phong and 
Ninh Binh in the north-east and Dong Thap in the south-west. Within each province, one 
urban and two rural districts were randomly sampled, followed by random sampling of three 
communes within each district, followed by random sampling of insured and uninsured 
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individuals with each commune. A total of 1,650 adults and 1,101 children were interviewed, 
of which 19% were residents of Ninh Binh, 40% of Hai Phong and 41% of Dong Thap. The 
survey collected data on baseline demographics, health insurance status, health care 
utilisation, out of pocket payments and self-reported health status for the three months period 
prior to the interview. The socioeconomic status of the respondent was recorded using annual 
household consumption expenditure in the last 12 months, which was adjusted for the 
household size using the following equivalence scale [45]: 
ܧݍݑ݅ݒ݈ܽ݁݊ܿ݁ ?݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ ൌሺܰ݋ ?݋݂ܽ݀ݑ݈ݐݏ ൅ ׎ כ ܰ݋ ?݋݂݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ሻఏሺ ?ሻ 
Following Wagstaff et al (1999) [46], the two unknown parameters ׎ and ߠ were set equal to 
0.5. Since the proportion of insured individuals in the population was small, the survey design 
oversampled the insured members by increasing their sampling frequency. For the purpose of 
analysis, sampling weights were used to account for the sampling structure. 
From a total sample of 2,751 interviewees, 1,192 individuals reported being ill in the past 
three months, of whom 985 sought health care and incurred out of pocket expenditure. 
Respondents were asked to recall direct health care expenditures (i.e. user fees for 
consultations, diagnostic tests and medicines), indirect expenditures (food and hospital stay, 
travel and other expenditures) and any unofficial payments (i.e. gifts to health care providers). 
OOP expenditure was then defined as the sum of these expenditures in the analysis. Data on 
insurance premiums had substantial non-responses, possibly because many individuals 
purchased their policy several months before the survey. Therefore, following Jowett et al 
(2003) [24], the premium amount was not included in estimations of healthcare expenditures 
for the insured. The resulting underestimation of expenditures for the insured is unlikely to be 
substantial, given the low level of premiums relative to average health expenditures amongst 
insured patients[24]. However, this does not matter for our methodological purposes of 
illustrating the differences between standard methods and our proposed new method of 
allowing for care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection when estimating out of pocket 
expenditures.  The lack of complete data on premia paid does however mean that the ³WUXH´
impact of VHI on reducing total health care expenditures will be slightly over-estimated by 
both the standard and the proposed models. 
3.2. Econometric models 
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We used four approaches to model the impact of VHI on out of pocket health care 
expenditure. The approaches differed in terms of whether or not the model accounted for care-
seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases. All models take as their dependent variable 
the log of the observed individual-level out of pocket expenditure on health care. Individuals 
who did not seek health care, despite reporting illness, had zero observed expenditure. Since 
the log of zero is undefined, a positive constant (+1) was added to the expenditure for all 
individuals. Household consumption expenditure was also log-transformed because of the 
skewed distribution. All models used heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The 
econometric models are described below. 
3.2.1. Model 1: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model for expenditure on care 
Model 1 is a naïve OLS regression represented by equation 1; it uses (log) observed health 
care expenditure for both care-seeking and non-care-seeking individuals.  
ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௒ሺ ?ሻ 
Since the expenditure on care equation is semi-logarithmic, the coefficient on insurance 
variable was transformed using equation (6) [47] to estimate the percentage impact of 
insurance on expenditure on care.  
ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݂݋ݎ݉݁݀ ?ܿ݋݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ݐ ൌ ቆߚ െ ? ?ܸܽݎሺߚሻቇ െ  ?ሺ ?ሻ 
Here ߚ is the untransformed regression coefficient on the insurance variable and var(ߚሻ is the 
variance of the untransformed coefficient. The coefficient on the insurance variable represents 
the impact of insurance membership on out-of-pocket expenditure. The OLS model ignores 
selection on unobservables resulting in care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection 
biases. 
3.2.2. Model 2+HFNPDQ¶VVDPSOHVHOHFWLRQPRGHOto account for care-seeking 
selection only 
Model (2) accounts for care-VHHNLQJ VHOHFWLRQ ELDV E\ XVLQJ +HFNPDQ¶V VDPSOH VHOHFWLRQ
approach that jointly estimates the care-seeking decision and the expenditure equation (OLS) 
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conditional on care-seeking. This model involves two equations: (a) a care-seeking sample 
selection equation that models the selection decision [equation 3]; and (b) a expenditure 
equation using log of health care expenditure for individuals who sought care [equation 7], i.e. 
the dependent variable is non-zero expenditure conditional on seeking care. 
ሾܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௭ܼ௜ ൅ߝ௜௖௦ሻሺ ?ሻ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁௜ȁሺܿܽݎ݁ െ ݁ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௛ሺ ?ሻ 
+HFNPDQ¶V PRGHO jointly estimates equations (3) and (7) using maximum likelihood 
estimation, which allows for correlation between the unobserved determinants of the care-
seeking decision and the healthcare expenditure equation (correlation coefficientߩ). The 
model was identified using functional form assumptions about joint normality in correlation 
of the error terms However, this model only accounts for care-seeking selection but ignores 
the insurance selection bias. 
3.2.3. Model 3: Treatment effects model to account for insurance selection only 
 
To account for the endogeneity of the insurance decision, +HFNPDQ¶Vtreatment effects model 
is commonly used [25] [24] [18] [31]. The treatment effects model also contains two 
equations: (a) a selection equation which models the insurance-seeking decision [equation 4]; 
and (b) an unconditional expenditure equation [equation 1] which uses log of health care 
expenditure for both insured and uninsured individuals for both care-seeking and non-care 
seeking individuals.  
ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜௒ሺ ?ሻ 
The treatment effects model jointly estimates the insurance-seeking probit model and the 
healthcare expenditure model using maximum likelihood estimation. This allows for 
correlation between the unobserved determinants of the insurance decision and the healthcare 
expenditure equation. As noted by Wagstaff et al. (2010) [43], the model makes the 
assumption that there are no further unobserved benefits from insurance for individuals who 
choose insurance (i.e. the estimates of the effect of insurance for the insured can be 
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generalised to the uninsured if they were to receive insurance). However, the treatment effects 
model ignores the care-seeking selection bias. ,W IXUWKHU GLIIHUV IURP +HFNPDQ¶V VDPSOH
selection model (model 2) in two aspects: (a) the endogenous choice variable (i.e. insurance 
variable) directly enters the outcome (expenditure) regression; and (b) expenditure is observed 
for both choice groups (i.e. insured and uninsured).  
 
The treatment effects model relies on uniquely identifying the insurance selection process 
[equation 4] from the outcome equation [equation 1] using predictors, also known as 
instrumental variables (or simply instruments), that uniquely predict the selection decision, 
i.e. they are correlated with the insurance decision but uncorrelated with OOP expenditures 
except through their effect on insurance. In the current study, the following binary variables 
were used as instrumental variables to identify the insurance-VHHNLQJ GHFLVLRQ µUHVSRQGHQW
knows that VHI subsidises drugs expenditureV¶µUHVSRQGHQWNQRZVZKHUHWREX\9+,FDUG¶
µUHVSRQGHQWLVD member of otheUPDVVFRPPXQLW\RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶µUHVSRQGHQWKDVPHGLXPWR
KLJK OHYHO RI ZRUU\ DERXW SHUVRQDO IXWXUH KHDOWK¶. Also, since insurance membership was 
sought more than three months before the survey, the following variables are used to identify 
the healthcare expenditure (outcome) equation: µhospital inpatient stay in the last three 
PRQWKV¶and µWKHnumber of illnesses in the last three months¶ 
 
3.2.4. Model 4: Two part selection model to account for both care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking biases 
The previous two models separately corrected for either care-seeking or insurance-seeking 
selection bias, but not both. Since the healthcare expenditure model can potentially suffer 
from both kinds of biases, a dual-selection model (model 4) is proposed here to jointly 
account for the two selection decisions.  
The model has two selection-correction parts:  
- The first part is an insurance decision model ± this is simply the insurance probit 
model which is presented in the equation below (same as equation 4 before): 
ሾܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ?ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௩ ௜ܸ ൅ߝ௜ூேௌሻሺ ?ሻ 
                                                 Addressing care-seeking as well as insurance-seeking selection biases                       
16 
 
This insurance decision model is used to estimate the so-FDOOHG ,QYHUVH 0LOOV¶5DWLR ,05
(ߣ݅) for each person in the sample. IMR represents the unobserved propensity to 
purchase/participate in insurance, given that insurance was available. If, based on known 
characteristics, the predicted probability of insurance-seeking is high and the individual is 
observed to have purchased/participated insurance, then the influence of unobserved variables 
(and hence the IMR) would be small, and vice versa [48]. It can be represented 
mathematically as: 
ߣ௜ ൌ ۖەۖ۔
ۓ Ԅ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ Ȱ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ൘ Ԅ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻ ሾ ? െ Ȱ௜ሺߚ௩ܸሻሿ൘ ݑ݊݅݊ݏݑݎ݁݀ ሺ ?ሻ 
IMR is then used in the second part of the model (see below) to account for unobserved 
propensity of purchasing/participating in insurance. As before, equation (4) is estimated with 
exclusion restrictions, (instrumental) variables that uniquely predict insurance membership 
but not care-seeking or OOP expenditures (i.e. the second part of this model). 
- The second part is the Heckman sample selection model for the care-seeking decision 
± this is the same as model 2 (presented earlier) but this time augmented by a 
correction term known as Inverse Mills Ratio  which is obtained from the first 
component of the model above. This IMR term is used as a covariate in both the care-
seeking and OOP expenditure parts of Heckman selection model (model 2). 
The reason for using IMR from the selection (insurance) equation in the outcome equation is 
that selection bias is essentially an omitted variable bias, which occurs due to unobserved 
factors that predict insurance decision and are also correlated with care-seeking decision and 
OOP expenditure. Inclusion of the IMR term as a covariate in the care-seeking and OOP 
expenditure equations helps to capture the correlation between unobserved predictors of 
insurance and outcome equations and therefore helps to correct for the selection bias. If the 
IMR in the expenditure equation is significant and negative, it implies a negative correlation 
between unobservables in the insurance participation and OOP expenditure. In other words, 
unobserved factors that decrease insurance participation will also tend to reduce OOP 
expenditure. Hence, the final healthcare expenditure equation accounts for the insurance-
seeking selection through the inclusion of the IMR from the first part (4a) of the model (i.e. 
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the insurance probit) and also accounts for care-seeking selection by jointly estimating the 
expenditure and care-seeking equations in the second part to allow for error correlation.  
The final care-seeking and OOP expenditure equations are estimated jointly using Heckman¶V
sample selection correction maximum likelihood model can be represented as: 
ሾܥܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ሿ ൌ Ȱሺߚ௭ܼ௜ ൅ ߚ௦ܫܯܴ ൅ߝ௜௖௦ሻሺ ?ሻ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁௜ȁሺܿܽݎ݁ െ ݏ݁݁݇݅݊݃ ൌ  ?ሻൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺܫ݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ߚ௖ܫܯܴ ൅ߝ௜௧ ሺ ? ?ሻ 
Here equation (9) is the care seeking selection equation, while equation (10) is the 
expenditure equation conditional on care having being observed/sought. Both equations 
include IMR as covariate to account for unobserved predictors of the insurance decision. 
These equations are estimated jointly using Heckman maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure. 
4. RESULTS 
This section starts by describing the raw data, comparing unadjusted mean differences in 
healthcare expenditure between insured and uninsured groups by socioeconomic groups, 
before turning to the econometric results. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
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The descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Appendix A1. Most 
respondents were residents of rural areas and 41% of them were farmers by profession. The 
insured made up 20.25% of the sick sample, and were likely to be more educated and in hired 
employment. Figure 1 summarises health care expenditures as proportions of total household 
consumption expenditure. As one would expect, although richer quintile groups incurred 
higher expenditures of care in absolute monetary terms, the proportion of income sacrificed 
was substantially lower than in the poorest quintile groups. The figure shows that the 
proportionate shares were consistently lower for the insured group. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
4.2 Regression results 
The regression models used in this study estimate the impact of insurance membership on 
healthcare expenditure. The analysis was carried out using Stata version 12.1. The unit of 
analysis was an individual for whom the questionnaire was completed. 
Table 1 presents the main results from the expenditure models.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The OLS analysis was carried out on all individuals who reported illness over the past three 
months. The observed expenditure for those who did not seek care was zero. The OLS model 
takes both zero and non-zero values as expenditures, and does not explicitly model the care-
seeking decision. The OLS model passed the Ramsey RESET test with test score F (3, 1,164) 
= 0.32 and p > F = 0.81, and had an R-squared value of 0.25. OLS results show a statistically 
significant negative effect of insurance membership on the log of health care expenditure 
[Table 1]. After the transformation in equation (6), the OLS model estimates that insurance 
membership reduced OOP expenditures by 51.3% (see figure 2). Regression results also show 
that the socioeconomic status of an individual is positively related to their observed healthcare 
expenditure, suggesting positive income elasticity which makes intuitive sense. Expenditure 
on health care was also observed to have a strong positive relationship with inpatient 
admissions and long-term health care status. Patients who self-assessed their health as fairly 
bad, or those who were suffering from long-term illness, incurred substantially higher 
expenditure than those in good health.  
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The OLS model does not correct for potential care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection 
bias. Following Waters (1999) [49], we tested for the presence of care-seeking and insurance-
seeking selection biases by separately introducing the predicted probabilities from the care-
seeking and insurance-seeking probit models into the OLS model. Statistically significant 
coefficients (care-seeking: p = 0.02; insurance-seeking: p = 0.00) indicated the presence of 
selection biases. 
+HFNPDQ¶VVDPSOHVHOHFWLRQPRGHO(model 2) is employed to allow for care-seeking selection 
by joint estimation of  healthcare expenditure and care-seeking equations. The coefficient on 
insurance in the Heckman model was much higher at -0.949 compared to -0.676 in the OLS 
model [Table 1], suggesting that the correlation between the residuals of the care-seeking 
probit and  healthcare expenditure models should not be ignored. The rho parameter for 
independence of the care-seeking and expenditure equations in the sample selection model 
was weakly significant (p = 0.06). After the transformation based on equation [6], the impact 
of insurance was estimated to be 63.1% (see figure 2). The coefficient on log of consumption 
expenditure also showed a small increase after correction for care-seeking bias. We also 
evaluated the coefficients in the care-seeking equation in the model that suggest that 
socioeconomic and insurance status does not significantly influence the decision to seek care 
[Table 2], although insurance significantly reduces the  healthcare expenditure when 
treatment is sought. 
Model 3 is the treatment effects model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of the 
insurance decision. This model has been commonly employed in the literature and aims to 
correct for insurance selection bias by independently identifying insurance-seeking decision 
whilst jointly estimating the  healthcare expenditure model. However, the model ignores any 
potential care-seeking selection bias. The insurance-seeking equation was identified using 
instrumental variables that identify the insurance-seeking process. Following Waters (1999) 
[49], the appropriateness of the identifying variables was tested by introducing the identifying 
variables on the right hand side of a reduced form probit equation for the insurance-seeking 
decision. Statistically significant coefficients on identifying variables indicated that the 
variables were appropriate candidates. Subsequently, the identifying variables were included 
on the right hand side of the healthcare expenditure model to establish that they did not 
significantly predict the expenditure model.  
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The coefficient on the insurance variable in model 3 was -1.086, compared to -0.676 in the 
OLS model, suggesting that the OLS model had underestimated the impact of insurance 
membership on healthcare expenditure. Following equation [6], the impact of insurance on 
healthcare expenditure was estimated to be 69.0% (see figure 2).  The rho parameter for 
independence of the insurance-seeking and expenditure equations in the sample selection 
model was statistically significant (p = 0.01) indicating significant correlation between the 
residuals of the insurance-seeking probit and healthcare expenditure models. We also 
evaluated the coefficients in the insurance-seeking equation in the model that suggest that 
years of schooling and rural residence were positively associated with insurance seeking 
decision, while female gender, wage employment and chronic illness were negatively 
associated with the insurance-seeking decision. The coefficients on identifying variables 
suggest that the insurance decision was indeed positively associated with medium to high 
level of worry about future health, membership of mass organisation and knowledge about the 
benefits of VHI and where to get the membership card. 
Models 2 and 3 account for either care-seeking or insurance-seeking selection decisions but 
not both. Model 4 aims simultaneously to account for the two types of selection decisions by 
introducing the IMR termfrom the insurance probit (the first part of model 4) into the 
Heckman sample selection equations in the second part of the model (i.e. the healthcare 
expenditure and care-seeking equations). IMR and its squared and cubic forms have different 
levels of statistical significance in the selection part of the model. Large values of the t-ratio 
associated with the IMR term suggest the presence of sample selection bias [50].  
Results from model 4 show that the effect of IMR in the healthcare expenditure model was 
positive and concave, suggesting that the unobservable factors associated with the insurance 
decision are associated with higher healthcare expenditures but at a diminishing rate. In the 
care-seeking model, IMR was found to have a negative effect on the probability of seeking 
care. The Wald statistic for independence of the care-seeking and  healthcare expenditure 
equations rejected the null-hypothesis of no correlation [p>z = 0.01]. Most importantly, the 
coefficient on insurance membership in model 4 was -1.238 compared to -0.676 in the OLS 
model, suggesting that the naïve model significantly underestimated the impact of insurance 
by ignoring selection biases. When the coefficient was transformed using equation [6], the 
magnitude of the impact was 72.3% compared to 51.3% estimated in the OLS model (see 
figure 2). This shows that not accounting for the selection biases underestimated the impact of 
voluntary insurance by 21 percentage points. 
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(Figure 2 about here) 
5. DISCUSSION 
This paper develops an approach to account simultaneously for insurance-seeking and care-
seeking selection biases in modelling the impact of VHI on health care expenditures.  We 
illustrate these methods using survey data on the impact of a Vietnamese voluntary health 
insurance programme on individual out-of-pocket health care expenditure. The naïve OLS 
model suffers from important selection biases due to care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
decisions. This is because correlation between the expenditure on care and unobserved 
determinants of the care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions is likely to produce biased 
estimates. Although previous studies have allowed for insurance-seeking selection bias, these 
studies have not allowed for simultaneous care-seeking selection. The contribution of this 
paper is to propose and illustrate a method for simultaneously allowing for both forms of 
selection bias.  In our illustrative example, we use four different econometric models to 
compare the results of naive OLS against models allowing for each form of bias, both 
separately and jointly. 
Results from the naïve OLS model suggest that insurance membership reduces out of pocket 
expenditure by 51.3%. When both insurance-seeking and care-seeking decisions were taken 
into account, however, the impact of insurance on reducing health care expenditures increased 
to 72.3%. Moreover, results also confirmed the presence of correlation between health care 
expenditure and unobserved determinants of the selection decisions.  
The relative magnitude of the impact of the two selection decisions on insurance coefficients 
in the expenditure model will depend on the level of selection bias in a particular study. The 
care-seeking bias is important in the case of low-income countries with predominantly out-of-
pocket healthcare systems where the decision to seek care is often correlated with the 
expected healthcare expenditure. The impact of correcting for care-seeking bias is likely to be 
higher when insurance status is a strong predictor of the care-seeking decision, i.e. the insured 
have a higher probability of seeking care when ill. This was not found to be the case in the 
illustrated example of Vietnam, but studies in other contexts have found that the insured are 
more likely to seek care when ill and to seek care from higher-level providers [18] which 
would result in higher expenditures in the insured group.  
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We compared our results with Jowett et al (2003) [24] who used the same data but only 
corrected for insurance selection but ignored the care-seeking selection bias. The final 
coefficient of the impact of insurance on OOP expenditures was higher in Jowett et al, i.e. -
1.6 compared to our final estimate of -1.24. This is because they estimated the impact of 
insurance for individuals who sought care, and therefore benefitted more from insurance 
membership in terms of reduction in OOP expenditures. Therefore, the estimate from Jowett 
et al  [24] is not generalisable to the wider population who need health care, and is also not 
directly comparable to our estimates. 
Our illustrative analysis found that socioeconomic status had a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with out of pocket health care expenditures. However, richer quintile 
groups were found to pay less as a percentage of their total consumption expenditure, 
consistent with the findings in other studies of Vietnam[51, 52]. This mirrors broader 
concerns about inequity in health care financing in low-income countries that have been 
extensively discussed in the literature [53] [30] [54]. 
The study also finds that insurance membership did not have a statistically significant impact 
on the probability of care-seeking, suggesting that other factors may play an important role in 
the care-seeking decision. One such factor may be geographical access to health services, 
since province of residence is associated with the care-seeking decision. 94.05% of the sick 
residents of Dong Thap sought care, compared to 66% and 86% of residents from Hai Phong 
and Ninh Binh provinces, respectively. 
We also modelled the probability of health insurance uptake, which was found to be 
positively associated with the socioeconomic status of an individual.  Richer individuals were 
more likely to purchase insurance, and in turn to benefit from expenditure reduction. This is 
likely to have equity implications, especially if the insurance fund is subsidised through 
government funding.  
Our study uses data on a relatively small health insurance programme targeting just three 
provinces of Vietnam to illustrate our method of accounting for double selection bias. 
However, the issue of double selection bias is also likely to occur in larger programme 
evaluations with broader populations.  Indeed, one might anticipate that as programmes target 
and evaluate broader populations the insurance-seeking element of bias may reduce ± because 
there is less scope for selection ± whereas the care-seeking element of bias may increase.  
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This is because broader programmes are likely to include older, sicker and more 
disadvantaged populations who are likely to face greater care-seeking barriers. Moreover, 
selection biases also depend on the type of coverage and benefits of health insurance 
programme as well as the study context. For instance, while compulsory health insurance 
programmes are generally not affected by insurance-seeking adverse selection, they may still 
suffer from care-seeking selection issue. In case of Vietnam, Sepehri et al (2011) evaluated 
both compulsory health insurance (CHI) and voluntary health insurance (VHI) programmes 
and found that the impact of CHI on reducing OOP healthcare expenditure was higher than 
VHI. This may be partly because VHI is more likely to be influenced by adverse selection. 
Similarly, coverage (such as type of services and health facilities covered) and level of 
insurance co-payment may also the impact of insurance and the influence insurance-seeking 
and care-seeking selection biases. 
In case of Vietnam, a number of studies have used a national dataset from different waves of 
the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) to evaluate the impact of different 
types of health insurance programmes. Appendix table A3 summarises the methods and 
results of studies evaluating the impact of health insurance in Vietnam. These studies evaluate 
one or more of the following insurance programmes in Vietnam: (1) voluntary health 
insurance (VHI); (2) compulsory health insurance (CHI); (3) Vietnam Health Care Fund for 
the Poor (VHCFP); and (4) free healthcare for children under 6 years. These studies come to 
different conclusions which are summarised here. Sepehri et al. (2006) [25] evaluated both 
VHI and CHI together using VHLSS for 1992-3 and 1997-8 and corrected for care-seeking 
bias using Tobit model (fixed and random effects) but not accounting for insurance 
endogeneity. They found that insurance reduce OOP expenditure by 17% to 20%. Jowett et al 
(2003) used the same dataset as our study (i.e. survey of three provinces in year 1999), and 
corrected for insurance endogeneity but not care-seeking bias (and only used positive OOP 
expenditure observations). They found that VHI significantly reduced OOP expenditure, 
although their coefficients are much larger than ours results because they only used 
observations with positive OOP expenditures (therefore, their model results cannot be 
generalised to the wider population). Finally, Nguyen (2012) [6] evaluated the impact of VHI 
using VHLSS 2004 and 2006 using PSM and double differencing (i.e. difference-in-
difference) to account for insurance selection and found that the effect of VHI on OOP 
expenditures is not statistically significant; however, they found that insurance increases the 
annual outpatient and inpatient visits by 45% and 70% respectively which partly explains no 
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statistically significant reduction in OOP expenditure despite insurance reducing the price of 
care. 
Wagstaff (2007) [55] evaluated VHCFP programme in Vietnam using VHLSS 2004 wave 
using propensity score matching (PSM) for insurance selection and found that it did not 
reduce the average out-of-pocket expenditure because it increased the probability and number 
of inpatient and outpatient visits. The same programme was evaluated by Axelson et al (2009) 
using PSM followed by double differencing for insurance endogeneity, and by Wagstaff 
(2010) using PSM followed by triple differencing to account for both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity (see Appendix for details). Axelson et al (2009) found that VHCFP 
reduced only inpatient OOP but not overall expenditure, while Wagstaff (2010) found that 
VHCFP reduced both inpatient OOP and total OOP expenditures. Finally, Sepehri et al 
(2011) evaluated CHI, VHI and VHCFP using VHLSS waves 2004 and 2006 using fixed and 
random effects models and found that CHI and VHI reduced OOP expenditure at district 
hospitals by 40% and 32% respectively but did not reduce expenditure for those using 
commune health centres. 
The above studies account for observables, and in most cases also unobservable, of the 
insurance-seeking decision (through PSM or regression with/without difference-in-difference 
methods). However, none of these studies simultaneously accounted for care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking biases which may partly explain some of these differences in findings [56].  
The focus of our study was on selection on unobservables, while also accounting for 
observable differences using regression model. As noted earlier, selection on observables can 
be dealt with using different approaches, with regression and matching methods being the 
most popular in the literature. We found in our data that respondent characteristics were 
similar for most observed characteristics, and more importantly, the predicted propensity for 
insurance had complete overlap (i.e. common support). Based on this, the choice of method 
for dealing with observable difference is unlikely to be significant in this study. Moreover, 
neither regression nor matching account for selection on unobservables. Finally, our proposed 
approach for selection on unobservables can be easily applied to matching methods using 
weighted propensity score method. 
There are also other econometric approaches available in the literature that account for 
selection on unobservables [57] [58]. At least one of them, i.e. the instrumental variable 
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DSSURDFK KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WR EH HTXLYDOHQW WR +HFNPDQ¶V VDPSOH VHOHFWLRQ PRGHO when 
selection decision is binary (which is the case in this study) [59]. Further research can explore 
if using other selection models produce similar results. 
The modelling approach used in this study is relevant to non-randomised settings evaluating 
the effect on insurance on OOP expenditures. Randomised studies, such as the RAND health 
insurance experiment [60], which allocated individuals to different health insurance plans, are 
likely to have balanced groups in terms of their unobserved propensity to seek care (by virtue 
of randomisation). As a result, the average treatment effect can be estimated without the need 
to account for selection biases. However, most health insurance studies are not randomised, 
and therefore need to consider the issue of care seeking selection bias. Allowing for sample 
selection bias implies estimates can be generalised to individuals who did not seek care [61], 
ZKLFK DGGUHVVHV WKH LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQ RI µ:KDW ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ WKH HIIHFWV RI KHDOWK
LQVXUDQFHKDGWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOVVRXJKWFDUH"¶ 
The study has some limitations. Firstly, identification of the care-seeking equation relied on 
non-OLQHDULW\RIWKHLQYHUVH0LOO¶VUDWLR. Whilst this is the common practice when instrumental 
variables are not available [50], the care-seeking decision may be better identified with unique 
instrumental variables. For the insurance-seeking selection, we used instrumental variables, 
though of course identification is only as good as the instrumental variables used. Secondly, 
HeckmDQ¶V VHOHFWLRQPRGHO DVVXPHVELYDULDWHQRUPDOLW\RI HUURU WHUPVRI the selection and 
outcome equations. The consequences of violation of this assumption should be explored in 
future work. Thirdly, whilst our proposed approach controls for the first hurdle, i.e. the care-
seeking decision, it did not completely control for the quantity and quality of healthcare 
received. In a case study of China, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) [18] found that insurance 
encouraged individuals to seek care and to seek care from higher-level providers, which will 
have an effect of the estimation of true impact of insurance on OOP expenditure. Finally, 
insurance premiums were unknown for most respondents and, hence, were not included in the 
analysis. This means that all models will   over-estimate the impact of voluntary insurance; 
however, the overestimation is unlikely to be substantial, given the low level of premiums 
relative to average health expenditures amongst the insured. 
In conclusion, when access to health care is determined primarily by ability to pay, out-of-
pocket payments are one of the most significant barriers to health care access, resulting in an 
inequitable distribution of health and health service utilisation [44] [62]. Hence, evaluation of 
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the impact of VHI and other schemes on reducing out of pocket expenditures is important, in 
order to find both expenditure-effective and equitable ways of extending financial protection 
mechanisms to improve access to health care.  This study has developed a method for 
allowing simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases, and has 
highlighted the significance of employing unbiased econometric models for estimating the 
impact of health insurance on the healthcare expenditure. In the context of low-income 
countries, where substantial numbers of individuals may be deterred from seeking care due to 
geographical and financial barriers to access, it is important to allow for care-seeking 
selection bias as well as insurance-seeking selection bias. Finally, our method can be 
generalised to evaluation of other types of health insurance programmes (such as social 
insurance) if they include an element of choice for the enrolment and care-seeking decisions 
that can be influenced by expected future healthcare expenditures. 
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Figure 1: OOP health care expenditure as percentage of total consumption expenditure 
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Figure 2: Impact of insurance membership on out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure  
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Table 1: Results of econometric analysis of healthcare expenditure 
Dependent variable: 
Log of individual level 
healthcare expenditure 
Model 1: OLS 
Model 2: sample 
selection model 
allowing for care-
seeking selection 
Model 3 - 
Treatment 
effects model 
allowing for 
insurance-
selection 
Model 4: Sample 
selection model 
allowing for both 
care-seeking and 
insurance-selection 
Member of VHI 
programme 
-0.676** -0.949*** -1.086*** -1.238*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Log of equivalent annual 
household expenditure 
0.419** 0.459*** 0.437** 0.488*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.002 
(0.65) (0.71) (0.75) (0.90) 
Age-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.76) (0.66) (0.87) (0.82) 
Female 0.041 -0.184 0.033 -0.193 
(0.91) (0.51) (0.93) (0.51) 
Interaction between age 
and sex 
0.004 0.010 0.005 0.010 
(0.59) (0.14) (0.56) (0.13) 
No. of illnesses in last 3 
months 
-0.028 0.010 -0.029 0.010 
(0.65) (0.84) (0.63) (0.83) 
Inpatient admission in last 
3 months 
2.332*** 2.488*** 2.320*** 2.467*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Health status: fairly good 0.061 -0.201 0.031 -0.243 
 (0.82) (0.46) (0.91) (0.39) 
Health status: fairly bad 0.800** 0.721*** 0.796*** 0.700** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Health status: long-term  0.909** 0.698* 0.906** 0.675* 
Illness (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) 
Chronic illness 0.099 0.103 0.077 0.076 
 (0.76) (0.72) (0.80) (0.78) 
Rural residence 0.304 0.317 0.316* 0.332* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Province: Hai Phong -0.524 -0.008 -0.549 -0.004 
 (0.23) (0.99) (0.20) (0.99) 
Province: Ninh Binh 0.011 0.144 -0.017 0.115 
 (0.96) (0.62) (0.93) (0.68) 
Occupation: service 0.270 0.385** 0.250 0.350* 
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(0.28) (0.03) (0.31) (0.05) 
Occupation: farmer 0.021 -0.040 -0.004 -0.077 
(0.90) (0.85) (0.98) (0.72) 
Occupation: wage 
employment 
-0.166 -0.252 -0.185 -0.284 
(0.31) (0.18) (0.24) (0.14) 
Years of schooling -0.022 -0.010 -0.014 -0.002 
(0.53) (0.75) (0.67) (0.96) 
Interaction between 
schooling and gender  
0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 
(0.96) (0.71) (0.95) (0.74) 
Interaction between 
schooling and age 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.50) (0.30) (0.55) (0.34) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - - - 0.471* 
- - - (0.08) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio ± 
squared 
- - - -0.236*** 
- - - (0.00) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - cube-
root 
- - - 0.018 
- - - (0.48) 
Constant -0.635 -0.791 -0.701 -0.892 
(0.66) (0.51) (0.62) (0.45) 
Rho - 1.269* 0.224** 1.197* 
 - (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) 
Sigma - 0.406*** 0.479*** 0.398*** 
 - (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 1189 
R-squared 0.26 - - - 
Robust p values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2: Intermediate probit models of care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions 
Covariates: 
Care-seeking model 
(part of model 2) 
Care-seeking model 
with correction for 
insurance-selection 
(part of model 4) 
Insurance-seeking 
model  
(part of model 3) 
Member of VHI programme -0.254 0.317 - 
(0.33) (0.50) - 
Log of equivalent annual 
household expenditure 
0.185 0.190 0.355* 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.10) 
Age -0.015 -0.013 -0.265*** 
(0.64) (0.68) (0.00) 
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
(0.60) (0.64) (0.00) 
Female 0.259 0.302 -1.333*** 
(0.70) (0.67) (0.00) 
Interaction between age and sex -0.001 -0.001 0.048** 
(0.94) (0.92) (0.03) 
No. of illnesses in last 3 months -0.092 -0.088* - 
(0.10) (0.09) - 
Health status: fairly good 0.416 0.464* -0.525** 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.02) 
Health status: fairly bad 0.334 0.351 0.679* 
 (0.29) (0.23) (0.07) 
Health status: long-term  0.682 0.716 0.590 
Illness (0.29) (0.23) (0.44) 
Chronic illness -0.003 -0.009 -1.720*** 
 (0.99) (0.98) (0.00) 
Rural residence 0.078 0.074 0.988* 
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.08) 
Province: Hai Phong -1.196*** -1.171*** -2.117*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Province: Ninh Binh -0.551* -0.531** -2.080*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) 
Occupation: service 0.039 0.035 -0.838* 
(0.92) (0.93) (0.07) 
Occupation: farmer 0.224 0.241 -0.345 
(0.45) (0.42) (0.58) 
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Occupation: wage employment 1.463 1.539* -1.213** 
(0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
Years of schooling -0.033 -0.037 0.166*** 
(0.59) (0.58) (0.00) 
Interaction between schooling 
and gender  
0.012 0.010 0.029 
(0.83) (0.85) (0.74) 
Interaction between schooling 
and age 
0.000 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.78) (0.77) (0.01) 
Respondent has medium to high 
level of worry about future 
health 
- - 1.888*** 
- - (0.00) 
Member of a mass organisation - - 0.909*** 
- - (0.00) 
Do you know where to go get hi 
card? 
- - 2.432*** 
- - (0.00) 
Do you think or know of any 
benefit of VHI when getting 
medicines? 
- - 0.597*** 
- - (0.01) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - -0.221 - 
- (0.57) - 
Inverse Mills' Ratio ± squared - -0.244** - 
- (0.02) - 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - cube-root - 0.047* - 
- (0.09) - 
Constant 0.270 0.142 -4.885*** 
(0.86) (0.93) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 
Robust p values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendices 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest 
  
Respondents 
reporting 
sickness in the 
last 3 months 
(N=1,192) 
Sick 
respondents 
who sought 
health care 
(N=982) 
Insured 
who were 
also sick  
(N=242) 
Uninsured   
who were 
also sick 
(N=950) 
Variable Name Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Member of Voluntary Health 
Insurance 
(percentage of respondents) 
20.25 17.09 - - 
Age (years) 
 
35.86 35.95 34.80 32.42 
Female 
(percentage of respondents) 55.75 56.70 38.59 56.38 
 
Rural resident 
(percentage of respondents) 
81.81 82.22 72.20 71.65 
 
Resident of Hai Phong 
(percentage of respondents) 
8.32 6.43 31.95 7.17 
 
Resident of Ninh Binh 
(percentage of respondents) 
28.33 27.67 4.98 48.89 
 
Resident of Dong Thap 
(percentage of respondents) 
63.35 65.90 63.07 43.94 
 
Occupation ± service/business 
(percentage of respondents) 
11.55 11.28 8.71 10.33 
 
Occupation ± farmer 
(percentage of respondents) 
41.28 41.12 25.31 29.82 
 
Occupation - hired 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
6.80 7.38 8.30 5.48 
Occupation ± student 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
22.32 21.18 22.82 35.83 
Occupation ± retired 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
7.68 7.36 2.90 6.74 
Occupation - other 
(percentage of respondents) 10.37 11.68 3.32 12.96 
 
Number of years of schooling 
 
5.32 5.18 8.19 6.03 
Health status - good 
(percentage of respondents) 20.27 18.64 37.76 21.29 
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Health status - fairly good 
(percentage of respondents) 
51.54 52.66 37.34 52.90 
     
Health status - fairly bad 
(percentage of respondents) 16.21 16.33 14.11 11.70 
 
Health status - long-term illness 
(percentage of respondents) 
11.99 12.37 10.79 14.12 
 
Chronic illness 
(percentage of respondents) 
14.78 15.16 12.45 13.28 
 
Number of illnesses in the last 3 
months 
2.01 2.02 2.08 1.88 
 
Inpatient care (yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
10.19 9.82 13.25 9.20 
 
 
Table A2: Average health care expenditures per person in the last three months (by consumption 
quintiles) 
  
 
Poorest 
quintile 
µ91' 
(N = 239) 
Quintile 2 
µ91' 
(N = 238) 
Quintile 3 
µ91' 
(N = 238) 
Quintile 4 
µ91' 
(N = 240) 
Richest 
quintile 
µ91' 
(N = 236) 
Total 
µ91' 
(N = 1,192) 
 
Insured 29.85 29.86 45.87 52.95 98.99 66.69 
Uninsured 176.40 101.29 356.28 159.15 283.30 212.76 
Average 174.758 98.418 322.697 170.794 268.020 206.091 
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Table A3: Summary of published studies evaluating the impact of health insurance in Vietnam 
Study Data Type of analysis Results 
Jowett et al 
(2003) 
Single cross-sectional 
survey conducted in year 
1999 using purposive 
sampling to evaluate the 
voluntary component of 
9LHWQDP¶VYROXQWDU\
health insurance (VHI) 
programme ± before the 
introduction of Vietnam 
Health Care Fund for the 
Poor (VHCFP). Survey 
conducted in 3 provinces 
(Ninh Binh, Hai Phong 
and Dong Thap). This 
data is the same as used 
in our paper. 
+HFNPDQ¶VWZR-step 
regression was used to correct 
for insurance endogeneity. 
First step was a probit 
regression for probability of 
insurance. Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR) was obtained from this 
model and included in the 
OLS regression for out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenditure. 
The expenditure equation 
included only non-zero values 
for health expenditure; hence, 
care-seeking selection was 
ignored. 
Overall, health insurance was 
found to reduce average out-
of-pocket expenditures. The 
dependent variable was the log 
of out-of-pocket expenditure. 
The coefficient on insurance 
was -2.080 (p=0.001) after 
correcting for insurance 
endogeneity which was 
interpreted incorrectly as 
200% reduction in 
expenditure. 
Sepehri et 
al (2006) 
National data from 1992-
3 and 1997-8 waves of 
the Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey (VLSS) 
WRHYDOXDWH9LHWQDP¶V
health insurance 
programme; however, 
unlike Jowett et al 
(2003), both compulsory 
(predominant) and 
voluntary health 
insurance was included 
and jointly evaluated 
because VLSS did not 
provide distinction 
between the two types. 
Two approaches were used 
with panel individual effect: 
(1) Tobit model which treats 
zero expenditure as censored 
(i.e. censored value for 
selecting into care, not 
insurance); and (2) truncated 
regression which uses only 
positive expenditure. Fixed 
and random effects models 
were used. 
 
Insurance endogeneity bias 
was not taken into account, 
partly because both 
compulsory and voluntary 
insurance was included. 
Random and fixed effects 
models produce different 
results. Final set of results 
show that health insurance 
reduces out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (between 17 and 
20%). 
Wagstaff 
(2007) 
National data from 
VHLSS 2004. The study 
evaluated VHCFP which 
was introduced in 2003. 
Propensity score matching was 
used to account for insurance 
endogeneity, followed by 
regression weighted by 
propensity score weights. 
Total out-of-pocket health 
expenditure is reduced by 
VHCFP in the simple PSM but 
not with the regression. The 
study concluded that VHCFP 
did not reduce average out-of-
pocket expenditure because it 
increased the probability and 
number of inpatient and 
outpatient visits. A secondary 
finding was that VHCFP 
reduced the risk of 
catastrophic spending by 3-
4%. 
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Study Data Type of analysis Results 
Axelson et 
al (2009) 
VHLSS data from 2002 
(pre-VHCFP) and 2004 
(post-VHCFP) 
First analysis used PSM for 
selection into insurance 
followed by single 
differencing (i.e. difference in 
OOP expenditure between 
insured and uninsured at one 
time point) in a cross-section 
analysis of VHLSS 2004. 
Second analysis used PSM 
followed by double 
differencing (or difference-in-
difference, i.e. first calculating 
the mean difference in 
outcome before and after the 
intervention for the insured 
and uninsured groups 
separately, followed by 
calculating the difference 
between the mean differences 
of the two groups). This is 
done using panel dataset for 
VHLSS 2002 and 2004; the 
double differencing is to take 
account of time-invariant 
unobserved factors. 
The result from the double 
differencing differs from 
single-differencing. Single 
differencing found statistically 
significant reduction in OOP 
expenditure at household level 
by 19% (although reduction in 
per capita expenditure of 14% 
was not significant). Results of 
difference-in-difference also 
found reduction in health care 
expenditure but they were only 
significant for inpatient care 
expenditure (absolute 
reduction of 134.6 Vietnamese 
Dong). 
Wagstaff 
(2010) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 
2002, 2004 and 2006 
waves. 
Triple-differencing which 
involves difference-in-
difference over three periods, 
i.e. besides the double 
difference-in-difference 
between insured and uninsured 
(as above), a further difference 
LVWDNHQWRµQHWRXW¶WKH
difference between the same 
groups in the change in mean 
OOP expenditure over an 
earlier period. Instead of 
assuming parallel trends in the 
unobservables for the insured 
and uninsured groups, it 
assumes that the change in 
unobservables for each group 
in the two periods (2002-2004) 
and (2004-2006) is the same. 
This method can be used with 
regression or matching to 
control for observables.  
The proposed method 
estimates programme impact 
on those covered by it but not 
Single-difference with 
matching found no significant 
impact of VHCFP on out-of-
pocket expenditure. Double 
and triple-differencing found 
significant negative impact on 
total OOP expenditure (-181 
 and -327 VND respectively) 
and OOP expenditure on 
inpatient care (-131 and -248 
VND respectively). 
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Study Data Type of analysis Results 
those currently not covered. 
Sepehri et 
al (2011) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 2004 
and 2006 waves. The 
focus is on compulsory 
health insurance (CHI), 
VHI and insurance for the 
poor. 
Fixed and random effects 
models were used. Fixed 
effects analysis was intended 
to control for time-invariant 
unobserved individual effects. 
Endogeneity bias due to 
adverse selection into 
insurance was not taken into 
account. 
Random effects analysis 
showed that CHI and VHI 
reduce OOP expenditure by 
about 24% while health 
insurance for the poor reduces 
it by 15%. However, in the 
fixed effects analysis, the 
coefficients for CHI and VHI 
were not significant. Further 
analysis showed that CHI and 
VHI reduce OOP expenditures 
by 40 and 32%, respectively 
for those using district 
hospitals but not significant 
for commune centres.  
Nguyen 
(2012) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 2004 
and 2006 waves. The 
focus is on voluntary 
health insurance. 
PSM followed by double 
differencing (i.e. difference-in-
difference). 
The effect of voluntary health 
insurance on out ?of ?pocket 
expenditure on health care 
services is not statistically 
significant; however, 
insurance increases the annual 
outpatient and inpatient visits 
by 45% and 70% respectively 
which partly explains no 
statistically significant 
reduction in OOP expenditure 
despite insurance reducing the 
price of care. 
Nguyen and 
Wang 
(2013) 
VHLSS data from the 
panel element of the 2004 
and 2006 waves. The 
focus was on evaluating a 
government policy to 
provide free healthcare 
for children younger than 
(?\HDUV7KHSROLF\FDPH
into effect in the 
beginning of 2005. 
Difference-in-difference 
approach using VHLSS wave 
2004 (pre-policy) and 2006 
(post-policy) in a regression 
model controlling for potential 
confounders. 
Free health insurance reduced 
OOP health expenditure by 
US$5.09 in the age group 4-7. 
It also reduced the probability 
of having catastrophic OOP 
expenditure by 1.7 percentage 
point. 
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